Ethnic Politics and Individual Rights: An Alternative Vision for Ethiopia Messay Kebede

October 29th, 2013 Print Print Email Email

“The Constitution is not an instrument for the government to restrain the people, it is an instrument for the people to restrain government.” Patrick Henry

The prevailing assumption, which originates from the ideologues of ethnic politics, is that identity politics is a direct consequence of social inequalities resulting from the political or/and economic marginalization of groups of people defined by linguistic, racial, cultural, or religious particularisms. In response to the discrimination perpetuated by dominant groups, excluded groups politicize their particularisms to fight back and win equal treatments. They thus draw on their particularisms to forge political organizations that give them unity of purpose, articulate their grievances, and design strategies to implement their demands.

Let us agree that groups suffering from discrimination have the absolute right to protest and fight to redress the inequalities. The question is to know whether the creation of ethnic parties is a sine qua non for achieving such a goal. There is no doubt that the unification under an ethnic organization has a practical advantage, obvious as it is that no better representative for their demands can be found than an organization led by ethnic kin and exclusive committed to the well-being of the group. The downside, however, is that the strategy advocates the primacy of group rights and tends to devalue the importance of individual rights, without which democracy is simply an empty word.
Indeed, the condition of ethnic politics pushes individual rights into the back scene. The primacy of the groups means that individuals are defined by their membership to the group. In thus being an element of the group, individuals forsake sovereignty or autonomy; whatever rights they have, they are a derivation of the group. In this condition, the group or those who speak in the name of the group are not accountable to individuals. In contrast, modern or real democracy advances the notion of the individual as citizen, thereby investing rights, not in the group, but in the individuals. In fact, the group has no rights; only individuals have rights. The community is a free association of autonomous individuals, that is, an association to which individuals transfer some of their rights to ensure and protect collective well-being.

One undeniable lesson of history is that ideologies based on the primacy of group rights invariably institute dictatorial regimes. Whether the group is defined in terms of class, as in Marxism-Leninism, or ethnicity, as advocated by various ethno-nationalist ideologies, or religion, as promoted by theocratic movements and states, the outcome is always the rise of authoritarian regimes. Ethiopia has consecutively experimented two dictatorial regimes, first in the name of class emancipation and, second, in the name of ethnic liberation. Even though the ethnonationalist ideology resulted in the independence of Eritrea, the outcome was no different: Eritrea is languishing under a terrible dictatorship.
Strange indeed is the Ethiopian response to ethnic marginalization. If one is convinced that the major problem of Ethiopia is the ethnic issue, then the remedy should not have been the creation of ethnic bantustans. How can the disease become its own cure? The right approach should have been the depoliticization of ethnicity through the creation of a political system bringing people together not by ethnicity or religion, but by the shared values of freedom and equality. Unlike ethnicization, which only aggravates the problem, this last solution would remove it by making ethnicity politically irrelevant. This irrelevance would, in turn, allow the protection of ethnicity as a cultural characteristic of Ethiopian diversity. Better yet, it would even advocate the rehabilitation of ethnicity as a prerequisite for the restoration of freedom and equality.

A specific impairment of the ethnonationalist ideology is the undermining of national cohesion, the outcome of which is that the national entity to which ethnic groups claim to belong become permanently infested with political instability and lack of legitimacy. Most African countries regularly remind us that, once the ethnic disease has taken root, the resulting tendency to recognize legitimacy only to the state that has clear ethnic references seriously damages national cohesion and with it the possibility of wide agreement on the workings of a truly representative democracy. So far, democracy has not emerged from political systems comprising groups defined as sovereign entities and probably it will never will.

The question that needs to be asked here is the reason why ethnic politics either institute dictatorial regimes or undermine nations by the constant threat of secession or effectively end up in secession, without however delivering the promised democratic outcome. No need to beat about the bush, we have to question the proclaimed goal of fighting to remove inequalities. The claim is nothing more than the apparent or seeming reason hiding the real intention, which is that ethnic politics is not so much about eliminating embedded inequalities as competing for the control of state power. In other words, ethnic politics is about elites vying for power: it is how elites amplify and use existing grievances to mobilize ethnic groups behind their leadership and try to seize power in their name. Short of power, these elites can also be quite content to become partner of the elite controlling state power, provided that they are given authority over their own ethnic groups. In the language of ethnic politics, the group achieves self-determination when it is ruled by kin elites, regardless of the type of rule to which the group is subjected.

Accordingly, the fundamental shortcoming of ethnic politics is that it does not contain the imperative of intra ethnic freedom and equality. It definitely protests against ethnic inequality, but it does it in the name of the group. This way of positing the problem does not subject emancipation to the effective exercise of freedom and equality by individuals. The group can be promoted to equality or even to hegemony over other groups, without thereby implying that the individuals composing the group should themselves be free or treated equally. This is the gist of the matter: unless individual rights are placed clearly above collective rights, the institutional mechanisms liable to put the representatives of the collective power under a democratic control are simply lacking.

As a matter of fact, the opposite tendency is more in line with ethnicization: those who claim to represent the group are not accountable to the individuals for the simple reason that sovereignty is invested in the group and individuals are not the source of authority. The ethnic constitution of Ethiopia begins with the statement, “We the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia.” What comes first is not the free individual, but the group, that is, the nation or the nationality. And to dispel all misunderstanding, the constitution adds: “All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia.” By contrast, the American Constitution, for example, begins with, “We the People of the United States,” and immediately specifies that the Constitution is ordained and established by the people so that sovereignty belongs to the people, and not to tribal, ethnic, or religious groups. The contrast resides in the singular usage of people by the American Constitution to signify united individuals forming one nation whereas the Ethiopian version refers to a collection of sovereign entities subsuming individuals reduced to the common characteristic of language, race, or religion.

Since ethnicization targets the liberation of the group as a distinct and self-sufficient group, freedom and equality are not natural rights of individuals, but entitlements as members of a group. The dispensator of rights is the group, and so rights are not natural, that is, inherent in individuals as individuals, prior to any membership to a group. Opposing the primacy of the group, the article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Equality and freedom are not derived from affiliation to a group; they are innate rights and, as such, inalienable. It is only as possessors of these natural rights that the ethnic or religious identities of individuals are protected since any discrimination violates article 2 of the Declaration stipulating that individuals enjoy all rights and freedoms, “without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” In other words, group rights are derivation of individual rights, and not the other way round.
A constitution advocating the primacy of group rights misses the fundamental shift in thinking that brought about modern democracy, namely, the notion of individuals as the source of all sovereignty. It belongs to the dustbin of history, given that it is no different from past monarchical systems in which sovereignty was invested in the monarch, the consequence of which was that the people were just subjects of the monarch. The thinking among ethnicist thinkers is that embedded ethnic inequalities cannot be overcome through the primacy of individual rights so that the primacy of group rights is the inevitable path to liberation. Precisely, the whole issue about the choice for a democratic society is that it requires the transformation of natural groups into free associations of sovereign individuals. Only thus can the group itself or those who claim to speak in the name of the group become accountable to the individuals composing the group. The condition of democracy is the dissolution of the group into sovereign individuals, who then recreate the group as a free, that is, as a contractual association.
What is more, without the effective guarantee of the primacy of individual freedom, group equality is meaningless. The ascendency accorded to a group leads to the mistaken thinking that the condition of its liberation is to deny all rights to the oppressor. This is to forget that the shackles by which you oppress the oppressors are also those that will silence you for the simple reason that the policy to oppress requires the establishment of a dictatorial system. Freedom is a special commodity: it exists only to the extent that it is shared. This truth has been stated loud and clear by none other than Nelson Mandela when he wrote: “Freedom is indivisible . . . To be free is not merely to cast off one’s chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others.”
We catch here the fundamental derailment of the Ethiopian intelligentsia since the 60s, to wit, the thinking that the freedom of some groups is conditional on the taking away of freedom from other groups. This manner of positing the problem invariably results in the institution of dictatorship. Thus, the Derg’s red terror started, not with the massacre of EPRP’s members, but with the educated elite’s approval of the summary execution of 60 dignitaries of the imperial regime. What happened next was simply the reaping of what the same elite had sown.
That is why national reconciliation is the only way out for countries torn by internal conflicts. The pursuit of reconciliation rather than revenge admits the indivisibility of freedom; as such, it targets the generation of a win-win situation, aware as it is that the refusal of reconciliation does no more than invite dictatorship, the end product of which is the loss of freedom for everybody. Freedom gained at the expense of another comes back as a boomerang and shatters itself. Freedom, like charity, begins at home.

What all this amounts to is that the recognition of the sovereignty of individuals, which is, as we saw, the sine qua none of all democratic systems, must have precedence over everything, including the creation of ethnic regions. In Ethiopia, the opposite direction was taken: guerrilla elites, who represented no one but themselves, imposed the ethnic regions on the Ethiopian people by sheer force of arms. Accordingly, undoing this illegitimate act is the first step toward democracy through the restoration of the primacy of individual rights. Only when the people regain their absolute right to decide without any precondition and give their free consent by a majoritarian vote after an open and sustained debate between supporters and opponents of ethnic politics can ethnic regions become representative democratic units.

Those who now rule Ethiopia are quite aware of the severe drawbacks of ethnic politics. That is why we hear them glorifying the Chinese model, even though the ideologue and the founding father of the system, namely, the late Meles Zenawi, had repeatedly asserted in the past that multipartism is a must for Ethiopia owing to its ethnic diversity and protracted conflicts. To take China as a model is not only to reverse the prevailing thinking, but it is also to try to apply a model to a country that has little similarity with China, the most decisive difference being, of course, the Chinese unfamiliarity with ethnic entities. The recent infatuation with the Chinese model is an attempt to find a new justification for dictatorial rule, i.e. the continuous suppression of freedom and true democracy in exchange for economic advancement of the people. Since the divide and rule strategy of ethnicization has exhausted its ability to guarantee the continuous rule of the TPLF elite, there is need for an alternative ideology justifying dictatorship: hence, the exaltation of the Chinese model.

In the face of this futile attempt to delay the inevitable, genuine opposition must continue to demand the restoration of the right of Ethiopian people to decide whether or not they approve the ethnic fragmentation of the country. The divide of the Ethiopian opposition on the question of the acceptance of the TPLF constitution must give way to a unified stand demanding that the Ethiopian people must first be in a position to exercise its full sovereignty. The legitimate order is not first ethnicity and then individual rights; rather, it is first individual rights and then ethnicity, if the people so choose by a clear and free vote. The first method puts the cart before the horse and, as such, gives up legitimacy in favor of a dictate by force of arms; the second starts from freedom and yields a legitimate power, thereby avoiding the deadly contradiction of promising freedom in a political system whose founding act is the denial of freedom by sequestrating people behind ethnic borders.

  1. aha!
    | #1

    Thank you professor Messay Kebede for this article in support of flow system cahrting, modular approach of resolving the ethnic and secessionistas well as totalitarianism and/or state capitalism approach the TPLF/eprdf regime has adopted in its constitution together with party alignments along ethnic agenda rather than national agenda for unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty of Ethiopia and Ethiopians, where the last item refers to individual freedom, liberty and equality to super cede, ethnic and secessionist rights to avoid the struggle between the factions of Ethnic nationalism on the armed struggle and Ethiopian nationalism and Ethnic federalism on the home front, where the parties in OPDM/EFDF/Medrek/fdre are mirror imaging the TPLF/eprdf regime with the current constitutional framework in tact. On the fringe there those with national agenda for unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty of Ethiopia and Ethiopians to restore individual rights ahead of group rights, to restore Ethiopian nationalism and its sovereignty and resorting to original provincial boundaries with assorted ethnic groups This article of yours serves as background justification for that movement or factions with national agenda and strategies to achieve those goals to establish a democratic government that rules by the consent of the governed and democracy established by free individuals of ethnic and secessionist politics and/or policies built into the constitution, whereby if the individual rights are respected the group rights follow.

  2. Dany
    | #2

    Thank you very much Professor!
    You are always carrying out your duty as a responsible citzen !
    I appeal to all intellectuals to follow suit before our beloved country got destroyed by clan politics.Ethnic politics in Ethiopia degenerated into Clan politics now ,getting from bad to worse.Look diferences between Showa Oromo vs Arsi Oromo or Adwa Tigreans vs Tembien Tigreans , or Gojames vs Gonderes .
    Where are we heading compatriots ? We are heading to a point the country cannot have any central government to keep it going as a sovereign State.Zemene Messafent in 21ST Century !!God bless Ethiopia .

  3. aha!
    | #3

    Furthermore, demarcation of ill defined boundaries among the major ethnic groups, serve as a prelude to future boundary conflicts and a prelude to secessionism by those lined up under ethnic nationalism, leaving Ethiopia under constant skirmishes of armed struggle and inability to develop the country as a one nation state with liberal and/or social democracy in which free market capitalism with private property ownership for the silent majority of Ethiopians serves as one of the means of production.

  4. Sam
    | #4

    Merssay’s article articulates that ethnic politics is a means the ethnic elites use to grab political power. I cannot agree more. Messay wrote “if one convinced that the major problem of Ethiopia is the ethnic issue, then the remedy should not have been the creation of ethnic bantustans. “How can the disease become its own cure?” He asked. It could not be. But for the ethnic politics elites that argument sounds groundless. ” In the language of ethnic politics, Messay elaborates, the group achieves self-determination when it is ruled by kin elites, regardless of the type of rule to which the group is subjected.” Messay concludes then in ethnic politics group rights become more important than individual rights. The way Messay sees it democracy will not flourish in a country where individual rights gave way to group rights. That is correct. But I still wonder even whether the group rights Messay is talking about really exists. Or is it a political means the elites use to ride on the back of the group just to grab power? I hate generalization. I know there are differences of opinions,to some degree, how the elites see the ethnic issue. Given the political knowledge the Ethiopian elites had some forty years ago, It is not an overstatement to say some elites truly believed ethnic politics as a means to address the political, economic, and social backwardness the country exhibited. Almost nearly all of them did not live long. And those who calculated ethnic politics to be a means to grab power, they won the battle. It is sad, but true. the idealists usually do not live long. Those who count constantly who is on their side, and who should be given the final solution will come a “winner.” Isayes of Eritrea is a golden example.

  5. Asmesay
    | #5

    Ethiopia is marching forward no matter how much repeated non-sense our desperate, expired and pseudo-intellectuals like Mesay & wanna be Al Gore AlMariam talk day in and day out. Talk is cheap. Do something useful for the people before you eventually go to your grave.

  6. ግሩም
    | #6

    Dear Professor Messay I think we have talked a lot, and shall continue doing so in the future as well, about Ethnic politics and individual rights in so many occasions.
    However mostly we time and again have failed in discerning the big picture or monster lurking in the background which is:
    So many Ethiopian political elites have failed to figure out this other biggest monster, very larger than Nation-State, which is insidiously self-organizing, perpetuating and lurking in the background. Please read this article very carefully especially the “Individual Recognition” part of this article which is very useful for the subject at hand. After we finish reading this article then we start to see the paradox and the other side of the coin where we see four vital things in politics which are roughly arranged from small to big in physical and geographical boundaries.

    1) Individual-right/identity
    2) Collective-right/identity based on race, ethnicity, religion, sex or other collectivistic factors
    3) Nation-State
    4) Global-Governance or Global-Empire in what we call with the mere euphemism of Globalization.
    The above four categories are all intermingled and there is no such a black and white boundary among themselves and hence there is a spectrum of interrelationship among themselves. When I say the paradox what I want to say is that while we are heading, willingly or forcefully, for a systemically globalized world which is also transcending Nation-State boundaries what is the significance of being entrapped in Ethnicity? Here the classical Nation-State essence and sovereignty is being challenged from two different directions one from what we call as Globalization and the other from Ethnic politics and sectarian religion like we see it in TPLF-Ethiopia, Africa, middle-East and other 3rd world nations. For me the above four things when arranged in the above order becomes some how circular in that when the first “1) Individual-right/identity” is naively and gullible hyped in today’s globalized world then it fits with or aligns with the fourth “4) Global-Governance” because it creates the essence of a universal individual in such a psychologically conditioned and controlled manufactured homogenous global society.
    That is the irony behind R2P(Responsibility To Protect). The other very important question we have to also raise is “What is the inherent nature of our social-fabric and the ensuing psychological make-up as an individual?” For example an individual who has been grown up in the individualistic Western world has some how a different identity and hence views him/her self in a different orientation than the one who is in the collectivistic Eastern world. We may say I am Oromo or Tigre or Amhara or Guragie or Gambella or Adere or ….but at least we are willingly or forcefully psychologically conditioned and controlled or guided to become a global homogenous consumer society even beyond the realm of the Nation-State Ethiopia. Who is not enthusiastically watching European Foot-ball in Ethiopia today? Or who is not using the Western style fashion and cosmetic irrespective of our Ethnicity? I think the biggest umbrella of humanity as an end-game unite us all irrespective of dynamically changing intermediate differences based on ethnicity, religion, and other superficial appendages which serve as a means. So claiming that I am Tigre or Oromo or Amhara or ……….. or Christian/Islam/Judaism/Hindu or … is just one of a means or criterion of identifying the individual-self but not the only and last criterion and means of identifying the individual-self let alone to become an end by itself. This is when we see things in pure and innocent form of rationalization.
    However the devil comes when such type of identifying the individual-self, accompanied with perverted prejudice, based on the criterion of Ethnicity or religion has a different insidious hidden motive in order to achieve a different insidious end-game that is associated with events and history. Through out history evil driven special interest-groups have always exploited such cards of collective-right/identity based on race, ethnicity, religion, sex or other collectivistic factors for their own strategic end-game. And due to this reason we do not simply claim that I am Tigre or Amhara or Oromo or simply label others as Tigre or Amhara or Oromo and stop at doing nothing but eventually we want to do something bad based on such categorization and perverted attribution. So eventually things end-up mainly as to whether we are personally good or bad guy and not as such we are Tigre or Amhara or Oromo. Believe me there is a very sinister deep-rooted human dishonesty with bad intention in our human nature. So the problem is not as such with self-identification of the individual-self based on ethnicity or Religion but rather mainly due to the perverted attribution/labeling and evil-driven motive behind such self-identification. Therefore, for me Ethnic politics like in Ethiopia is just a tactically contrived hype only to achieve the eventual strategic end-game of divide and rule/conquer in the long run. That is why I hate ethnically as well as pseudo-democracy driven fanatical politics in Ethiopia evolving in to becoming some sort of religion devoid of rational and scientific reasoning. Throughout history perverted attribution based on ethnicity, religion, sex … has mainly served the self-serving local as well as global elites and special interest-groups who subjugate and rule the naive and gullible mass. Otherwise we all as a human being and as a universal humanity have almost the same classical and universal end-game Material-needs, Emotional-needs and Spiritual-Needs irrespective of ethnicity, religion, sex …..So we do not need contrived artificial needs which even prevent us from achieving those classical and universal needs. For example claiming or being labeled as some sort of ethnic identity does not outweigh my end-game classical and universal needs. The same is true with the essence of Nation-State Ethiopia/Ethiopiawinet. So Nation-State Ethiopia/Ethiopiawinet is not as such an end-game by itself but rather just an intermediate means in order to achieve those end-game classical and universal needs. I support and fight for Ethiopia/Ethiopiawinet just only because for me it is the current and past best equilibrium-state means to achieve my
    individual as well as our collective end-game classical and universal needs. If Ethiopia is to disintegrate based on Ethnic lines then what will be the result? Can we have another achievable better equilibrium-state? I mean for Example if Greater-Tigray by forcefully annexing other areas is created then will it survive and stay as a viable and stable Nation-State without the ensuing regional tension and conflict? We have seen what has been happening for the last 22 years after secession of Eritrea with the ensuing land-locked greater mother country Ethiopia. Also we have seen what followed after the division of Sudan. Is there now real peace and stability in the region of Eastern Africa? We can imagine what will happen if Oromia is to achieve similar secession as is claimed by OLF.
    Even if there exits ensuing mini Nation-States then believe me there shall automatically follow also the accompanying Regional-Integration like Eastern-Africa, Western-Africa, Central-Africa, etc. in a way that serves the interest of foreign powers especially the West. The most important thing we have to focus is on the essence and motive of unity or division. We have to understand how the game of global empire works. We have to understand how Global Capitalism and its neo-Liberal and Neo-colonialism imperialistic projects work. Who mainly benefit from such virtual regional disintegration or integration is only foreign global powers who want to freely plunder our resources and their subservient local stooge comprador elites in power. The Ethnic politics card in Ethiopia only serves this strategic end-game. We are fed up and sick of ethnic politics and hence Ethiopian political elites better serve to help the peoples achieve their basic end-game needs and better life rather than hype the useless fashionable ethnically driven politics which does not even bring edible bread to the mass.

    God Bless Ethiopia!!!

  7. Ethnic- ideology and impelemen?
    | #7

    I want to thank you for raising the issues again but I totally disagree with your analysis of ethnic ideology/politics for three reasons.

    a. People always organize based on their ethnicity, age, religion, gender, professions. Reason is to protect or promote their interests.

    So, it is natural thing for people to organize themselves based on their ethnic origin to defend themselves from any threat(real or not), promote their interests, or .

    Sometimes the problems dictates on how people should organize themselves.

    b. We have to separate ideology from those who practicing it.
    It is not clan politics which destroyed the country. It is the wrong interpretation and implementation of the ideology.
    For example, take bible and Christianity and Christians. It is not the bible which commits crime- it is the people who misinterpreted it.

    c. Woyane is not representing Ethiopian ethnic groups by any measure. So It is not a good example to base your analysis on Woyane actions.
    Seeing woyane politicians dancing and wearing traditional clothes of ethnic groups does not mean they are addressing real developmental problems in the areas.

    e. Individual rights and group rights-

    In my opinion one does not replace the other and one necessarily is not the enemy of the other. After all individuals always belong to one of ethnic groups or mixed groups. But at the same time, they also belong to religious groups, gender, trade unions…
    I believe it is up to them to decide on what basis their organize themselves.

    We all run away from the problems especially educated ones.

    I do not believe in ethnic politics as a solution to Eth problems but I believe it is not the problem. What is missing in Ethiopia politics lack of honesty, debates on the issues respecting others opinions and working together, commitments to work for many years in the country side so that to bring changes, understanding world politics, and so on.

  8. aha!
    | #8

    The only thing TPLF/eprdf has in its control are the constitution and the alignment of parties along ethnic rather than national agenda, which the parties on the side of positive forces of integration and the negative forces of disintegration, consisting of TPLF/eprdf and its mirror image, with TPLF as the politbeuro running the government in collaboration with the security forces, military and federal police forces and killil administrators to uphold the constitution and party alignments along ethnic lines of ethnic rule supper imposed with revolutionary democracy and validation of TPLF/eprdf coalition of ex-liberation fronts which fought the Derg regime on the context of oppression of nations and nationalities, but not for class struggle, nor for the unity and territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia.

    With respect to economic model, the TPLF/eprdf regime, which took power with the promise to the western donor nations to democratize the country perhaps with a free market capitalism, because of its built in totalitarianism in the constitution found it complementary to adopt State capitalism of perhaps the Chinese model with the western capital of billions of dollars in terms of budget support and grants, not from tax revenues or revenues generated from development of natural resources on top of IMF funding for infrastructures under TPLF Political with State capitalism. To this may be added the corruption, exploitation, political and economic strangle hold of the countries natural resources and the silent majority of Ethiopians by TPLF/political, TPLF/EFFORT, TPLF affiliated enterprises, cadres and foreign corporations, much similar to the Dutch Boers of Ex-apartheid South Africa in terms of ethnic federalism, even though the boundaries for self-rule has been in existence, while in Ethiopia they newly demarcated ethnic boundaries and free market capitalism for the above mentioned enterprises may be much similar or similar to Italian Occupation in Eritrea and Italian Occupation of Ethiopia during the 2nd War which denies the full participation of the silent majority of Ethiopians to participate in the free market capitalism with private property ownership as means of production and accumulation of wealth in terms of Real Estate sector of the economy.

    The solution, believe is not reconciliation nor plead the TPLF/eprdf regime for political space, yekilil mengiat iqulent mebit mekeber, nor reconciliation before ousting the TPLF/eprdf regime, which decided independent judiciary of democratic government elected by free individuals, but it the rallying of the silent majority Ethiopians to stand up for individual freedom, liberty and equality ahead of ethnic and secessionist for one nation state called Ethiopia of federated original provinces with a constitution centered around individual rights rather than ethnic and secessionist rights.

  9. naji
    | #9

    ther is no cry for your emiye ethiopa . oromia shall be free !! will be free once for all ther is no division between oromos no shewa or arsi all oromian no matter our religion and region we are children of abaa gdaa !!!

  10. Ethnic- ideology and impelemen?
    | #10

    What is missing in Ethiopian politics that lead us to be organised based on ethnicity? Lack of inclusive politics? Poverty? Trust issue?
    Why do Ethiopian these days or even in the last 30 years want to take citizenship of other developed countries?
    Is it only Ethiopians who are leaving their countries to become European , American, Israeli-an, Turkish…?
    Is it really only poverty that drives people to leave their country?
    is nationalism being undermined in today’s world politics or not?
    was ethnic based politics a political fashion in the last 20 years or not? Is it only ethnic politics to blame for the crisis that we witness?
    is religion or faith being attacked as negative force in today’s politics or not?

    In my opinion, the political turmoil is everywhere. We should ask ourselves:
    In Africa politics, who is actually funding, arming, publicizing, legitimizing ethnic and religious based politics and benefiting from its success or failures?

  11. Tazabi
    | #11

    Maferia!!We know who you are !Same to Naji!

  12. ግሩም
    | #12

    The following article serves as a god reference for the current quandary in Ethiopia based on the following main factors:
    1) Individual-right/identity
    2) Collective-right/identity based on race, ethnicity, religion, sex or other collectivistic factors
    3) Nation-State based on the treaty of Westphalia
    4) Global-Governance or Global-Empire in what we call with the mere euphemism of Globalization.


    Source :

    Since states historically have always existed in the plural, the emergence of a world state requires the transformation of state identities to a global basis. This task is complicated by the
    fact that territorial states are local attractors. To be sure, they are always in process, maintained by practices of “domestic” and “foreign policy” that constitute them as distinct units (Campbell,
    1992; Jackson and Nexon, 1999), but these practices sustain homeostatic logics that may be veryhard to change.45 Nevertheless, I argue that a world of territorial states is not stable in the long
    run. They may be local equilibria, but they inhabit a world system that is in disequilibrium, theresolution of which leads to a world state. The mechanism that generates this end-directedness isan interaction between “struggles for recognition” at the micro-level and “cultures of anarchy” at
    the macro. In this section I address the former and in the next the latter.
    The struggle for recognition is about the constitution of individual and group identities
    and thus ultimately about ideas, but it is mediated by material competition. Since the material
    aspect of the story has already been partly told by Deudney, and might be thought sufficient to
    generate a world state, I begin there as a way of showing the necessity of the identity aspect. I
    do so, however, under the assumption that they form an integrated whole.
    Material Competition
    The material aspect of the struggle for recognition relates to the Hobbesian justification
    for territorial states.46 However, in the hands of Hobbes and most realists it points more toward
    the inevitability of continued anarchy than a world state.47 Only with Herz (1957) do we find a
    clear realist argument for the eventual transcendence of the state, which Deudney (1999; 2000)
    has systematized in his thesis of “nuclear one-worldism.”48 Neither Herz nor Deudney make the
    teleological claim that a world state is inevitable, and by themselves their arguments cannot
    sustain such a view. But they do provide an essential piece of the puzzle.
    Hobbes (1968) justified the state on the grounds that only through obedience to a
    “common power” could individuals escape the “nasty, brutish, and short” life in the state of
    nature. Obedience to a common power is necessary because of the physical equality of men:
    their endowments are sufficiently alike that even the weak can kill the strong. Since all are
    vulnerable, it is in everyone’s interest to accept the security provided by a state. The argument
    is in effect a rationalist one of costs and benefits. Death being the ultimate cost, the expected
    utility of obeying the state is greater than that of enduring the state of nature. Yet, Hobbes also
    argued that this reasoning did not apply between states. States are not as vulnerable to being
    “killed” as individuals, and so the state of nature they face is not as intolerable. This asymmetry
    undercuts realist descriptions of world politics as “Hobbesian” (Heller, 1982; cf. Mearsheimer,
    2001), but also seems to justify realist skepticism that anarchy would lead to a world state.
    Deudney challenges this conclusion by arguing that the scale on which it is functional for
    states to provide security is related to the destructiveness of coercive technology. As changes in
    the “forces of destruction” increase the “violence interaction capacity” in the system, the cost
    and scale of war rises (at least among equals), and with this change it becomes efficient for the
    size of states to expand as well (Deudney, 2000). A common example of this logic at work is the
    way in which the invention of gunpowder and artillery helped monarchs in late medieval Europe
    defeat feudal lords and expand their territories. The resulting territorial states were efficient for
    many centuries, but with the advent of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons they are now
    themselves becoming obsolete. Missiles can easily penetrate the boundaries of states, and when
    combined with nuclear weapons enable an aggressor to “kill” a state in one quick blow.
    Compared to the “billiard ball” pre-nuclear state, states in a nuclear world are more like “eggs,”
    whose shells are easily shattered by determined attack (Deudney, 1995: 228). In these material
    conditions states are no longer able to provide security for their inhabitants, and are as vulnerable
    as individuals in the state of nature. Hence “nuclear one-worldism”: just as the risks of the state
    of nature made it functional for individuals to submit to a common power, the growing
    destructiveness of military technology and war make it functional for states to do so as well.49
    Despite its apparently end-directed character, Deudney’s theory locates the primary
    cause of integration outside the states system, in exogenous changes in technology (1999: 108).
    These changes are contingent and transmitted to the system in efficient causal fashion, and so he
    rightly cautions that even though it is becoming functional for security to be organized on a global
    scale, this does not mean it will necessarily happen. In short, he does not attribute a telos to the
    system, and as such defends only the “probability” of integration, not its inevitability (ibid: 102).
    However, by bringing in the security dilemma we can show that technological
    development is (also) endogenous to the system, giving its material aspect a teleological logic.
    States often cannot trust each other’s intentions, and since in an anarchic world there is no third
    party upon whom they can count to defend them, they are forced to rely on their own resources
    to deal with threats. The result is the familiar arms race “spiral”: even if it harbors no aggressive
    intentions, a state fearful of its neighbors is forced to arm itself, forcing its equally untrusting
    neighbors to arm, threatening the first state more, and so on. Such competitive militarization has
    often been merely quantitative in character, which might not affect the scale on which security is
    functional. But the security dilemma also creates an incentive for qualitative competition
    (downward causation), since a technological lead may confer advantage in war. Not all states will
    act on that incentive, but those that do develop new technologies will gain an advantage, which
    other states will then imitate, and so on, thereby ratcheting up the minimum technology
    necessary for security. In this way the system itself generates a tendency for technology and
    war to become more destructive over time, and with it upward pressure on the optimal scale of
    It might be thought that this material dynamic is enough by itself to make a world state
    inevitable, but that is not the case, for two reasons. First, as Gregory Kavka (1987: 304) points
    out, the condition of states in a nuclear world differs in a critical respect from that of individuals
    in a state of nature: Mutual Assured Destruction means that a nuclear aggressor cannot expect to
    survive a war. Thus, even though states are vulnerable to being “killed” by nuclear attack, if we
    assume they are not suicidal then we can also expect them to be deterred by credible threats of
    retaliation. By holding the costs of intolerable war at bay, MAD ensures that the vulnerability of
    states in anarchy is not as desperate as that of individuals, which means they may prefer a
    nuclear stand-off to giving up sovereignty to a world state (as we saw in the Cold War).
    A second problem is linked by Kavka to an under-appreciated feature of Hobbes’ story.
    Hobbes used his theory to justify obedience to an existing state (by warning people what would
    happen if they did not obey), not to justify creating a new one out of the state of nature. It was
    a retrospective theory. This matters because even if we accept Hobbes’ rationale for obeying an
    existing state, when used prospectively – which is the way it must figure in a theory of world
    state formation – his theory is vulnerable to a serious collective action problem. The fact that it
    might be collectively rational for everyone to submit to a common power does not mean that it is
    rational for an individual actor to do so. In anarchy people might not trust each other enough to
    form a state, even if that results in a sub-optimal world. For such insecure actors, it is only after
    the state is created that it becomes rational to sign the social contract, since only then can they
    trust it to be enforced. Moreover, even if individuals in the state of nature submit to a common
    power, what guarantees the security of its members (individual soldiers and police) from each
    other? They face the same problem that people in the state of nature do: each is armed and so a
    potential threat to the others, and there is no still higher power to contain this threat. (Appealing
    to the authority of the sovereign will not do, since in Hobbes’ theory this depends ultimately on
    a monopoly of force, the possibility of which is precisely what is at issue). Used prospectively,
    in short, Hobbes’ theory leads to an infinite regress and so cannot make a world state inevitable,
    even though it might be functional after the fact.
    What is missing from the materialist theory of world state formation is an account of
    identity change. It assumes that actors in the pre-state situation are essentially the same as
    actors in the post-state: rational, self-interested maximizers. What changes with the emergence of
    the state are only the costs and benefits of complying with the rules, not the identities and
    interests of its subjects. The same assumption underlies Kant’s rejection of the world state.
    Even though democratic states trust each other enough to achieve perpetual peace, their identity
    as sovereign, egoistic actors facing a logic of contract does not change.50 Thus, to argue that a
    world state is inevitable, we need an account of why the boundaries of state identity will expand
    to include all people, not just erstwhile fellow citizens.
    The Struggle for Recognition
    Like Neorealism mine is a structural theory. However, to generate any movement in a
    structural theory we have to assume that actors want something, so that at the micro-level there
    has to be a goal-seeking element (and thus intentional teleology). Neorealists assume that above
    all else people want physical security,51 which means that what the logic of anarchy is “about” is
    a struggle for security. I agree that people want security. However, I think people also want
    recognition. That means that the logic of anarchy is also about a struggle for recognition, and
    indeed the latter may account for much of the realpolitik behavior that realists attribute to the
    struggle for security (Fukuyama, 1992: 255). The struggle for recognition has two levels, interindividual
    and inter-state, but first let me address the desire for recognition in general.
    The precondition for any act of recognition is a simple fact of difference or “alterity.”
    Individuals are given as different by virtue of their bodies, and groups are given as different by
    virtue of the boundaries they draw between themselves and outsiders.52 These facts may or may
    not be recognized by other actors. Recognition refers to the investment of difference with a
    particular meaning: another actor (“the Other”) is constituted as a subject with a legitimate social
    standing in relation to the Self. This standing implies an acceptance of normative constraints on
    how the Other may be treated, and a need to give reasons if they must be violated. Actors that
    are not recognized, like a slave or an enemy in the state of nature, have no such social protection,
    and so may be killed or violated as one sees fit.
    The risk to life and limb of being unrecognized is one reason why actors might have a
    “desire” for recognition, but there is more to it than simply physical security, for it is through
    recognition by an Other that the Self is constituted. We can see this dependence of the Self on
    the Other in our everyday identities: one cannot be a teacher without recognition by students, a
    husband without recognition by a wife, a citizen without recognition by other citizens. But the
    point is general, going all the way down to the constitution of subjectivity itself. In the state of
    nature there is no genuine subjectivity, just the “natural solipsism” of animals (Williams, 1997:
    ??). Only through recognition can people acquire and maintain a distinct identity. One becomes
    a Self, in short, via the Other: subjectivity depends on inter-subjectivity. Insofar as people want
    to be subjects, therefore, they will desire recognition. That said, an important and perhaps
    counter-intuitive implication of the recognition theory of subjectivity is that recognition also
    constitutes a collective identity, since recognition makes the Other part of how the Self is defined
    (Wendt, 1999: chapter 7). One cannot be recognized as different without also being recognized as
    at some level the same (cf. Brewer, 1991).
    There are at least two kinds of recognition, “thin” and “thick.”53 Thin recognition means
    being acknowledged as an independent subject within a community of law. To be recognized in
    this way is to have the juridical status of a sovereign person rather than being just an extension of
    someone else (like a child or slave), or freedom in Hegel’s positive, socially constituted sense.
    Thus, thin recognition is not about freedom from constraints, but about being seen by others as a
    legitimate locus of needs and agency – as a “subject” rather than an “object.” It implies rights in
    relation to a community that everyone is obligated to respect, and as such should be enforceable.
    In contrast, thick recognition means being respected or esteemed by significant Others, such as
    being seen as smart, virtuous, part of the in-crowd, and so on. It does not involve rights, nor can
    a community enforce it. Both kinds of recognition constitute forms of subjectivity, and both can
    be sources of conflict if they are not satisfied (Honneth, 1996). However, only thin recognition
    is relevant to my argument, since thick recognition cannot be created by a state. Thus, when I
    use the term ‘recognition’ below I shall always mean thin recognition.
    The desire for recognition is about wanting acknowledgement by the Other as an
    independent subject, not necessarily about extending recognition to the Other. As such, for any
    particular actor the desire can in principle be satisfied either symmetrically or asymmetrically: by
    recognition of the Other’s equality, or by securing the Other’s recognition without reciprocating
    it. For Hegel, a properly formed state is constituted by the former.54 As a definition of the state
    this goes beyond Weber’s monopoly of legitimate force, which can exist without recognition of
    equality (e.g. the American Confederacy or many states today). This reflects Hegel’s teleological
    view that the end of the state is not just to protect its members’ physical security, but to make
    their subjectivity possible, which cannot be fully realized until all are recognized as subjects. To
    be sure, there is mutual recognition of equality in the family and civil society, so even in Hegel’s
    terms it does not by itself make a state. What distinguishes the Hegelian state as a form of
    mutual recognition is its membership – all citizens of a (national) community of law – and the
    fact that unlike the family and civil society, it is an impartial judge with the ability to guarantee
    recognition by punishing people who break the law (Baynes, 2002: 6). In such a state the desire
    of all actors for recognition is satisfied, and we can therefore expect it to be highly stable.
    The case of asymmetric recognition is more problematic, and central to my subsequent
    argument. Inequality of recognition exists in various degrees, from the extreme of slavery, in
    which recognition is not mutual at all (the slave is merely an appendage of the master), to more
    subtle forms like ancien regime France, in which recognition is mutual but unequal (peasants have
    some subjectivity, but less than nobles). But what all such hierarchies share is that one actor
    satisfies its desire for recognition by denying full recognition to another (Fukuyama, 1992: 163,
    182). In a hypothetical world where anything was possible, being the dominant party in a
    relationship of unequal recognition might be an actor’s first choice, since their basic desire is to be
    recognized, and reciprocating that recognition to the Other means accepting limitations on the
    Self. This suggests a basis in recognition theory for the belief of some realists that human beings
    are driven by an inherent will to power (Nietzsche, 1989) or animus dominandi (Morgenthau,
    1946).55 By the same token, however, those not fully recognized will struggle for it as best they
    can, which makes any social order founded on unequal recognition unstable in the long run.
    The sources of instability are both material and ideational. Materially it can be costly to
    suppress desires for recognition. If people are denied something of fundamental importance to
    themselves their acceptance of a regime is likely to be half-hearted and dependent on coercion,
    which even Hobbes recognized was a less efficient and stable basis for order than legitimacy.56
    Of course, in a given historical conjuncture even people who are not recognized may perceive a
    regime as “legitimate” (more in a moment), but once their desire for recognition is activated into
    open resistance stability will be costly to maintain. And on the ideational side too there is a longterm
    threat, rooted in the logic of recognition itself. Even though A’s desire to be recognized by
    B is not in itself a reason for A to reciprocate, Hegel argues that recognition founded solely on
    coercion – his example is the master-slave relationship – is ultimately unsatisfying, because the
    failure to recognize the slave calls the master’s own subjectivity into question.57 Recognition is
    only valuable if it comes from someone perceived as having worth and dignity, and since the slave
    is not his recognition of the master is ultimately “worthless” (Williams, 1997: ##). Thus, the
    only way to secure fully stable recognition from the Other is to reciprocate it. In Hegel’s view
    this is a precondition for freedom: one can only be free if recognized as such, and that recognition
    is only valuable if it is freely given.58
    On the other hand, the fact that unequal recognition may be costly to sustain, or that
    recognition from a slave is “ultimately” worthless, does not mean that it cannot appear highly
    stable, and even legitimate in the eyes of subordinate actors. And of course historically this is
    what we observe: unequal political orders – “non-Hegelian Weberian states” – that survived for
    long periods of time. However, if we consider the sources of stability in such orders we can see
    that this does not militate against the importance of the desire for recognition.
    At the micro-level, recognition is not the only desire at work in the system: physical
    security is another, which may induce actors to put their lives before recognition.59 It might be
    thought that security is more fundamental, on the grounds that one cannot enjoy recognition if
    one is dead. But the desire for recognition doesn’t work that way. As a precondition for genuine
    subjectivity recognition is part of what makes security worth having in the first place, and people
    will often sacrifice their lives for it. Suicide bombers are the extreme case, but it seems hard to
    explain anyone’s willingness to fight in a war or participate in a revolution without appealing to
    their desire for recognition. On the other hand, it is equally clear that people will often not risk
    their lives for recognition. In Nietzsche’s (1989) view this is the choice made by the slave, which
    he therefore saw as characteristic of the “slave morality.”60 So my claim is only that the desire
    for recognition is on par with security, not that it always trumps. In addition, there is the factor
    of hegemony and “false consciousness.” People might have been socialized to think they do not
    deserve recognition, or that it is unthinkable for someone in their position. However, this does
    not mean that people do not fundamentally want it. The need might not be subjectively
    perceived, but it could still be an objective interest (Wendt, 1999: 231-33), which, when activated
    or given an opportunity for expression, will motivate actors to struggle for it. The possibility of
    hegemony, in turn, points toward the role of macro-level structures of physical and social power
    in stabilizing unequal recognition. States are homeostatic systems that exert downward causation
    on their members. This causation “disciplines” people to stay within the boundary conditions of
    the state most of the time of their own accord, and authorizes violence by state agents when they
    don’t. If we add to this the collective action problems facing would-be revolutionaries, it is clear
    that even if actors actively want recognition at the micro-level they may be unable to challenge
    the macro-stability of a system in a given historical conjuncture.
    These micro and macro sources of stability may enable structures of unequal recognition
    to survive for long periods of time. What I need to show, therefore, is not that desires for
    recognition never encounter resistance or are always successful, but that in the long run they
    undermine systems that do not satisfy them.
    I turn now to the two levels on which struggles for recognition take place. Given that
    human beings first organized themselves into autonomous groups, the struggle for recognition is
    not just about recognition as an individual in the abstract, but as a member of a particular group.
    Such recognition is a constitutive aspect of individual identity, since it is through groups that
    individuals historically have acquired subjectivity. Individual attachment to groups, manifested
    today in nationalism, is a reflection of this fact. People do not easily shed national loyalties even
    if other groups are available as substitutes. This “embeddedness” of individuals within groups is
    a key principle of communitarianism (Sandel, 1982). Liberals are more ambivalent. Probably
    speaking for many liberals, Fukuyama (1992: 201) argues that deep attachments to collective
    identities like the nation are “irrational.” Yet, in that case it is puzzling that for him history will
    end in a world of sovereign states. If history is an unfolding of Reason, why would it stop before
    attachments to national sovereignty had been overcome? On the other hand, some other liberals
    have accommodated a constitutive role for groups in individual identity (Tamir, 1993; Kymlicka,
    1995; Linklater, 1998). Like communitarians, they see group attachments as both natural and
    normatively valuable.
    The fact that human beings are initially attached to different groups has two important
    implications for struggles for recognition. First, within the system as a whole people confront
    each other not only as individuals but as members of groups, and so the struggle for recognition is
    mediated by group boundaries. This is true both within and between groups. Internally, the
    struggle for recognition implies that those from whom recognition is sought are merely other
    members of the group, not individuals everywhere. Indeed, a distinction between members and
    non-members is often constitutive of domestic recognition struggles, since participation in a
    privileged status vis-à-vis outsiders may be one of the reasons that insiders seek recognition in
    the first place. Externally, the struggle for recognition is mediated by group boundaries in the
    sense that even once it is complete within a group, individuals still face the problem that people
    in other groups do not recognize them. Territorial state sovereignty, in other words, is by its
    very nature a structure of unequal recognition. As a result, outsiders are denied rights and may
    even be killed not because of who they are as individuals, but simply because they are members
    of a different group. In that respect the members of sovereign states suffer a “common fate”
    (Wendt, 1999: 349-353). This may have little salience for individuals as long as their state can
    protect them from war, but as long as war is a possibility their recognition will be incomplete.
    Second, like individuals, groups too have a desire for recognition, in this case corporate
    recognition. This desire exists only in virtue of their members’ desires to secure the conditions
    for their subjectivity, but because those conditions involve common fate, if a group’s subjectivity
    is not recognized by other groups, then its members will not be recognized either. To that extent
    groups’ desire for recognition is relatively autonomous from, or supervenient on, the desire for
    individual recognition.61 Note that this does not mean that groups seek a world state. What
    groups want is for Others to recognize them, not necessarily to recognize Others. Nor does it
    mean that groups are forever unchanging. Group identity is a process not a thing, and as such its
    boundaries can be reconstituted on a higher level. But just as the willingness of individuals to
    participate in a collective identity ultimately depends on their recognition as separate individuals,
    so too would groups entering into a larger collective identity want their “difference” recognized.
    Universalism, in short, depends on recognition of particularism.62 World state formation is not
    only a cosmopolitan process, but a communitarian one as well.
    The struggle for recognition, then, operates on two levels simultaneously, between
    individuals and between groups. If we add to this the fact that some inter-group struggles today
    are taking place within existing state boundaries (as in sub-state nationalism), and some interindividual
    struggles are taking place on the global level (as in efforts to create a global human
    rights regime), at the micro-level we have a hugely complex picture, with many cross-cutting
    relationships. On the other hand, my argument is that these are all part of a single system-wide
    developmental logic. In order to highlight that logic in what follows, therefore, I shall make two
    simplifying assumptions: 1) struggles for recognition within current state boundaries, whether by
    individual or groups, can be bracketed; and 2) the units in struggles for recognition at the system
    level are initially states. The first does not imply that domestic struggles for recognition are over,
    that they are unimportant, or that they will not affect the process by which the global struggle
    for recognition unfolds. The point is only that because the system’s telos is multiply realizable
    at the micro-level, the details of domestic struggles do not affect its eventual end-state. The
    second assumption is justified by the facts that the system has always consisted of autonomous
    groups which limit inter-individual struggles across group boundaries, and those groups are today
    almost entirely states. Despite this state-centric starting point, however, as we shall see
    individual desires for recognition will emerge to play a crucial role in the system’s development.
    The struggle for recognition is the bottom-up aspect of my teleological argument. I now
    turn to its top-down aspect. I argue that the process of world state formation progresses through
    five “stages” of recognition, the first four of which form distinct cultures of anarchy (cf. Wendt,
    1999). As cultures each embodies shared information that constitutes boundary conditions on
    the interactions of the system’s parts, and as a progression of cultures they increasingly
    constrain those interactions, but in so doing enable growing subjectivity and freedom at the global
    level. What drives the system forward is the logic of anarchy, which through downward
    causation conditions struggles for recognition in two ways: by making it possible for them to be
    pursued through organized violence,63 and by generating military technology that makes the costs
    of such violence less and less tolerable. Each culture of anarchy is a way of regulating global
    struggles for recognition so as to keep their costs manageable, and as such constitutes a local
    attractor in the development of the system. However, all attractors before the world state are
    ultimately unstable. New stages with more demanding boundary conditions emerge as partial
    solutions to instabilities in the stage before it,64 but in turn bring about new instabilities that
    require further development for their resolution.
    Thus, the process of world state formation involves a “reorganization” of structures of
    individual and group recognition, from a world in which they are mediated by state boundaries to
    one in which they are not. Given that I have defined a world state in terms of the “thin” criterion
    of a global monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, but that the proposed end-state
    for the system’s development must satisfy a “thicker” criterion of mutual recognition of equality,
    what I am in effect arguing is that we will get a Weberian state by creating a Hegelian one.
    What follows is a theoretical rather than historical argument, in two respects. First, it is
    based on a conceptual analysis of “problems” of recognition that must be solved for a world state
    to emerge, not on historical experience. The fact that few real anarchic systems correspond to
    these ideal types is not particularly relevant. Second, the proposed progression of stages does
    not preclude backsliding in a given historical moment. The argument is not linear; it claims only
    that any step backwards will eventually be balanced by two steps forward. With those
    qualifications in mind I take up each stage in turn.
    Stage One: The System of States
    This is the stage of complete non-recognition, what Hobbes called the “warre of all
    against all” and Bull (1977) a “system” of states. This system is constituted by three boundary
    conditions: the fact of multiple interacting states (individuals are not actors at all here), or simple
    “difference”; the absence of any mechanism to enforce cooperation among these states (anarchy),
    and a mutual belief that they are “enemies” (Wendt, 1999: 260-3), with no rights and thus social
    constraints on what they may do. Because there is no recognition there is no perceived collective
    identity in the system, and by implication states do not even have genuine subjectivity. Insofar
    as states share an awareness that they are in a Hobbesian system it will constitute a “culture,”
    but this culture and its implicit collective identity will be “repressed” (ibid: 278).
    The Hobbesian stage is unstable in the long run because it does not begin to meet needs
    for recognition. Taking the dyadic case first, we can see this instability and its developmental
    consequences by considering the two possible outcomes of a struggle for recognition in such a
    system. One, which we would expect if one state is significantly stronger than the other, is the
    conquest and thus elimination of the weaker state. The dyad will become a single unit, and the
    locus of self-organization will shift to the interaction of this enlarged state with other states.65 If
    success begets success and conquests continue, then eventually there will be only one state left,
    and the system will no longer be anarchic. Such an outcome might come to be seen as legitimate
    by its subjects and thus be stable for some time. However, if the conqueror does not recognize
    its victims then they will eventually try to break away, thereby recreating an anarchic system. In
    other words, a Weberian world state that is not also a Hegelian one will be unstable in the long
    run. On the other hand, if the world conqueror does recognize its victims as full subjects, then a
    world state will be achieved without the intermediate stages of development.
    The second possible outcome would occur if the two states are equal in power. In that
    case neither can conquer the other, and they will continue to struggle for recognition. This need
    not involve constant warfare, but will require constant preparations for war that drain societal
    resources, and war will remain a significant probability. This dynamic too is not stable. Either
    one side will eventually get the upper hand and conquer the other, or they will “wear each other
    out” (Burbidge, 1994: 157) to the point that they realize that continued struggle is pointless, and
    agree to mutual recognition. The effect of anarchy on military technology is crucial here, since
    over time it will increase the cost of war, and with it growing negative feedback on a policy of
    non-recognition. Conversely, mutual recognition would create positive feedback, since it would
    allow competitors to devote more resources to recognition struggles with third parties, enhancing
    the likelihood of success there. This may be seen as a stylized account of the process that led to
    the Peace of Westphalia, and one might expect a similar outcome in, for example, the Israeli-
    Palestinian conflict today.
    Whichever outcome transpires, therefore, a Hobbesian anarchy is unstable in the long run,
    and will eventually move toward a non-Hobbesian attractor. In principle that could be any of the
    remaining developmental stages below, including a world state. However, so that I can detail the
    entire logic let’s assume that the system can only solve one developmental problem at a time.
    Stage Two: The Society of States.
    The instabilities of the Hobbesian culture can be resolved by moving to a system in which
    states recognize each other’s subjectivity, but not that of each other’s citizens. This is Hedley
    Bull’s (1977) “society of states,” or a “Lockean” culture of anarchy. Two boundary conditions
    remain the same as in the Hobbesian culture – alterity and anarchy – but instead of the third,
    enmity, states now constitute each other as “rivals” (Wendt, 1999: 279-83). Rivals recognize
    each other’s sovereignty as independent subjects. Taking away the right to conquer each other
    constrains their freedom to some extent, but makes possible a measure of positive freedom and
    subjectivity that does not exist in the Hobbesian world. There is also the emergence of some
    collective identity among states – they see themselves as a “We” bound by certain rules – that
    constrains their interactions in accordance with the culture’s norms. On the other hand, the
    depth of this collective identity remains shallow, and in particular, limited war remains
    acceptable. War may not be used to conquer other states, but is still legitimate for purposes of
    territorial or other gain – what John Ruggie (1998: 162-3) calls “positional” as opposed to
    “constitutive” wars. This generates two sources of instability.
    First, even though positional wars do not threaten states’ “lives,” they can still be costly,
    and these costs will tend to rise over time with secular improvements in military technology due
    to anarchy. Today, even conventional wars between equal states can be enormously destructive,
    and will be only more so in the future, a fact which may help explain their contemporary rarity.
    Second, even if states don’t get “killed” in positional wars, people do. As such, as in the
    Hobbesian culture, here too individuals are not recognized as subjects outside their own state, and
    thus as subjects in the world system. Individuals do not like dying in war, especially when their
    group identity is already recognized by other states. Given the importance of group identity to
    individuals, sacrifice in war makes sense in a Hobbesian culture, since people are fighting for
    individual recognition as well. But in a Lockean culture states have secured limited recognition,
    and so it is less clear how sacrifice for the state would meet individuals’ needs. Over time we can
    expect individuals to make those needs apparent to their leaders, inducing the latter toward
    growing caution in the use of force as a tool of diplomacy, particularly as the costs of war rise.
    Eventually, through this pressure from below states in a Lockean culture will learn to desist from
    war altogether, and to find non-violent means to solve foreign policy problems (at least among
    states that are similarly reluctant to go to war). This goes back to the central purpose of the
    state, which is not only to express but also to secure the recognition of its members: states
    cannot fully fulfill this function as long as they are willing to send their people to war. In short,
    what we see here is the emergence of individuals’ struggle for recognition alongside that of states
    as a force at the system level. The possibility of war means that individual recognition must be
    external as well as internal, which requires breaking down its mediation by state boundaries.
    This narrative of instability is similar to the logic of the “democratic peace,” in which the
    reluctance of individuals to die for their country in the absence of existential threats helps pacify
    relations among democratic states. However, it is not clear that my story depends on democracy
    at the unit-level. Such states may be sufficient for translating individuals’ desires for recognition
    into inter-state peace, but we do not know whether they are necessary.66 Since what matters to
    my argument is only that individuals’ desire for recognition be somehow realized, it seems wise
    at this point to leave open exactly how this would be accomplished at the domestic level.
    If a Lockean culture is not a stable end-state, then in what direction will the system go?
    One possibility is to descend back to a Hobbesian culture, as we saw in World War II. But even
    if the Axis had conquered the world, this would have merely set the stage for subsequent forward
    movement. Either the conquered peoples would have revolted, dismembering the Axis empire
    and restoring the logic of anarchy, or the Axis would have recognized them, constituting a world
    state. So even if the system backslides temporarily from its developmental path, the instabilities
    of the Hobbesian culture mean that eventually it must come back to the Lockean culture and its
    primary source of instability – war – which can only be resolved by moving forward.
    Stage Three: World Society
    The problem of war is solved by developing a universal security community, in which
    disputes are settled non-violently. This begins to extend global recognition from states to
    individuals, constituting a further boundary condition on the system’s operation. In that respect
    this stage is comparable to the kind of recognition that Hegel argues is present in civil society,
    and so it might be called cosmopolitan or world society as opposed to a society of states. The
    system has now constrained the liberty of its parts even more (they are no longer free to make
    war), but in so doing expanded positive freedom, now for both individuals and states.
    Yet, this developmental stage too is not a stable end-state, because of the absence of
    collective protection against aggression. Even if everyone today is committed to peaceful dispute
    resolution, there is always the possibility in the future of rogue states emerging through domestic
    revolution, which reject non-violence and attack other members of the system (cf. Mearsheimer,
    2001). In principle there are two ways to deal with this problem, neither of which is available in
    this culture. One is by centralized coercion. That is unavailable because in a world society states
    retain sovereignty. The other is decentralized enforcement by a collective security system. That
    may be unavailable as well, because by itself a security community is compatible with states
    being indifferent to each other’s fate; it imposes no requirement of mutual aid. A state threatened
    by a rogue could therefore not be certain that others would help defend it against aggression. To
    sustain a world society, therefore, actors need a more demanding form of recognition, one that
    imposes not only negative duties (non-violence) but also positive ones (mutual aid).
    Where does the system go from here? As always, there is always the possibility of
    degeneration back to Stage Two or even One, but as we saw above those outcomes are not stable
    in the long run either, and so will only bring us back to Stage Three again. Conversely, there are
    good positive reasons to move forward toward a commitment of mutual aid. Consider a system
    of three states, A, B, and C. If A and B have a security community they will both experience
    significant positive feedback: no fear of war, at least on one flank; a reduced need for arms; and
    recognition of both group and individual subjectivities. A and B will be reluctant to give these
    benefits up, and as such once peace has been achieved, they will have an interest in its being
    perpetual. Now let C become an existential threat to B (only). This would create the possibility
    for A that a previously peaceful border would be occupied by a hostile state, plunging the border
    back to a state of war. That gives A an interest in defending B, even though A is not directly
    threatened.67 In effect, the anticipated negative feedback of its neighbor’s demise sustains the
    positive feedback provided by their peaceful relationship. Since these incentives are mutual, both
    have reason to care about each other’s fate, and form a permanent alliance. This does not mean
    that states will always recognize these benefits, but those that do “think like a team” will have a
    better chance of survival than those that do not, suggesting that in the long run they will colonize
    the system (Cusack and Stoll, 1994; Cederman, 2001).68 Once the system reaches the stage of
    world society, therefore, the desire to reproduce it will induce it to develop even farther.
    Stage Four: Collective Security
    At this stage the system acquires an additional boundary condition: not only must its
    members – now both individuals and states – recognize each other’s right to exist and practice
    non-violent dispute resolution, but they must defend each other against threats on the principle
    of “all for one, one for all.” The system has now reached a “Kantian culture” of collective
    security or “friendship” (Wendt, 1999: 298-9). Actors have a well-developed sense of collective
    identity with respect to security, such that each sustains its difference by identifying with the
    fate of the whole. Although today we are far having from such an identity on a global scale, its
    benefits have already been demonstrated at the regional level. The ease with which the U.S. was
    able to put together coalitions to fight the Gulf War and today’s War on Terrorism, the
    persistence of NATO after the end of the Cold War, and even the Concert of Europe (Schroeder,
    1993; Mitzen, 2001) are all best explained by perceived common fate. In all these cases mutual
    recognition had positive rather than just negative behavioral implications.
    Note that a universal collective security system would not be a world state. Territorial
    states retain their sovereignty, and as such its functioning depends on their consent. A collective
    security system could not require its elements to continue recognizing each other, in the sense of
    commanding a legitimate monopoly of force to enforce it. The whole structure is voluntary in a
    way that a state is not. Strictly speaking, it remains anarchic. On the other hand, given that
    collective security seems to meet both individual and group needs for recognition, it is not
    immediately clear why anything more is needed. What is the cause of instability that propels the
    system forward to yet another attractor? This is the most difficult step in the argument.
    The difficulty is felt by Kant, whose teleology stops at the pacific federation, and if
    Fukuyama is representative this is also where contemporary Liberals end up. In fact Kant shows
    more ambivalence on this score than is sometimes thought. In “Idea for a Universal History with
    a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” he seems to endorse giving the federation enforcement powers that
    would significantly qualify the sovereignty of its members. However, later in “Perpetual Peace”
    he comes down more clearly on the side of a purely consensual system, with no coercive power
    at the supranational level (although suggesting that this is a “second-best” outcome).69 Kant’s
    skepticism about a world state is threefold: it is not feasible to organize and enforce political
    authority on a global scale; states will not give up their sovereignty to a world state in any case;
    and a world state would be despotic. Drawing on Deudney, I have already addressed the first
    concern: dramatic technological changes since the 18th century have made it possible today to
    project coercive power on a planetary scale. But the other concerns remain, seeming to indicate
    that the development of the system would stop with universal collective security.
    An argument for the inevitability of one more stage must begin with the instability of
    collective security as a solution to the struggle for recognition. Perhaps the most commonly
    adduced instability, usually emphasized by Realists, is that collective action problems make
    collective security inadequate as a deterrent to aggression; when it is most needed it is most likely
    to fail. While this problem has some force, it points not toward a world state but to the
    degeneration of anarchy back at least to a Lockean culture, if not to the war of all against all.
    Moreover, the Realist argument presupposes that states remain self-interested egoists, which is
    undercut by the kind of collective identity formation that would accompany the development of
    a collective security system. However, two other sources of instability are not so easily handled.
    First, because collective security is a consensus-based system in which states retain their
    sovereignty, it would have no right to prevent a state from “seceding” and then arming itself for
    aggressive purposes (Carson, 1988: 179-80). Kant tried to deal with this problem by calling for
    voluntary disarmament, but even if that were successful it does not solve the problem of possible
    re-armament in the future.70 Second, and more importantly, collective security does not fully
    secure individual and group desires for recognition. For what, in the end, is the retention of
    sovereignty if not retention of the right to decide, unilaterally, to revoke someone’s recognized
    status and if necessary kill them? A state might promise not to exercise this right, and even keep
    that promise for a long time. But as long as the right to kill is not permanently surrendered to an
    authority with the capability to enforce recognition, the Other will remain vulnerable to a change
    of policy by the Self. These problems suggest that a collective security system would not be a
    stable end-state. But we still need an argument for why this would lead to a world state rather
    than back to more primitive forms of anarchy. Three considerations suggest themselves.
    One is the memory of what anarchy was like before collective security. Just as the
    memory of World Wars I and II has been an important source of European integration (Waever,
    1995), so too could it be a source of universal integration, especially when reinforced by the
    rising costs of war due to technological change. Much like Hobbes’ retrospective argument for
    the state, this memory would serve as a constraint on the system’s degeneration, making a move
    back toward anarchy less attractive than a move forward to a world state.
    A second is that if states have enough collective identity to defend each other even when
    they are not themselves threatened, then de facto they do recognize obligations to each other and
    their citizens, and the de jure issue is moot. The only reason not to make recognition binding – to
    “constitutionalize” it – is to leave open the possibility of changing their minds, but that seems
    hard to square with a genuine commitment to universal recognition. Here Hegel’s argument that
    recognition that is not reciprocated is ultimately “unsatisfying” may come into play. The kinds
    of actors most likely to be vulnerable to such self-dissatisfaction are precisely those found at this
    stage of the system’s development: ones whose self-conception is that of civilized, law-abiding
    actors who believe that all individuals and groups should be recognized. Such actors would be
    particularly susceptible to the “civilizing force of hypocrisy” (Elster, 1995), and as such find it
    hard in the long run to justify to themselves not constitutionalizing their recognition of outsiders.
    However, while removing constraints on world state formation, these first two
    considerations are still in a sense negative, since they amount to reasons not to resist the
    attraction of a world state, not to embrace it. A third factor is therefore crucial: the struggle for
    recognition itself. Recognition that is not enforceable by a common power is in the end not really
    recognition at all, since it depends on the goodwill and choice of the recognizer. Genuine
    recognition means that the recognized has a right to recognition, and the Self therefore has a duty
    to the Other. Genuine recognition is about obligation, not charity. Only when acting on behalf of
    the Other has become an enforceable obligation is recognition secure.
    This point becomes particularly salient for the Great Powers, who are arguably the
    greatest hurdle to world state formation. The struggle of individuals and Small Powers for
    enforceable recognition is not particularly puzzling, since their weakness makes them vulnerable
    to the strong. They have little to lose from making mutual recognition of equality accountable to
    a world state. But the Great Powers are in a different position: they are not as vulnerable as
    other actors, they can enjoy unprecedented wealth as a result of their sovereign right to restrict
    immigration, and they have the ability to treat other states as they see fit. In effect, by virtue of
    their “go it alone power” (Gruber, 2000) they already have the material benefits of recognition
    without the costs. The current resistance of the U.S. to binding multilateral commitments is
    symptomatic of the problem. What could Great Powers gain by joining a world state?
    It is a good question, but consider what would happen in the long run if Great Powers
    insist on retaining their sovereignty. For the reasons identified above, a non-binding collective
    security system is not a stable end-state. As such, we can expect individuals and Small Powers
    to continue pressing for recognition, and as their violence potential grows through the diffusion of
    ever more destructive weapons they will be able increasingly to threaten the Great Powers (in the
    contemporary context think North Korea here, or al-Qaeda). Small and Middle Powers will also
    have incentives to amalgamate, creating new Great Powers that can “balance” existing ones, and
    perhaps setting in motion arms races. In such conditions the ability of Great Powers to insulate
    themselves from global struggles for recognition will erode, as will the legitimacy of unilateral
    action, making it more and more difficult to sustain a system in which their power and privileges
    are not tied to an enforceable rule of law. It may take some time for Great Powers – and perhaps
    especially “hyper-powers” like the United States – to see the light. But if the choice is between
    a world of growing threats as a result of refusing to fully recognize Others versus a world in
    which Others are not threatening because their desires for recognition are satisfied, it seems clear
    which decision rational Great Powers should make.
    Stage Five: The World State
    This brings us to the final stage in the system’s development, the world state. With the
    transfer of state sovereignty to the global level the recognition of individuals will no longer be
    mediated by state boundaries, even though as recognized subjects themselves, states retain some
    individuality (particularism within universalism). Individuals and states alike will have lost the
    negative freedom to engage in unilateral violence, but gained the positive freedom of fully
    recognized subjectivity. The system will have become an “individual” (Buss, 1987).
    The question remains, however, whether a world state would be a stable end-state, or be
    itself subject to instabilities that ultimately undo it. In other words, even if we assume that the
    logic of anarchy is teleological, how do we know that it involves a fixed-point attractor rather
    than, for example, a periodic attractor that would induce cycles of anarchy and world states?
    A partial answer is that a world state would have the capability to prevent secession,
    giving it a stronger homeostatic logic than any culture of anarchy. However, coercion alone does
    not seem enough, since individuals and groups will continue to evolve, and might at some point
    decide that what satisfied their desires for recognition in the past no longer does so. Efforts to
    crush such desires by force certainly have not prevented some existing states from breaking up.
    In thinking about whether the logic of anarchy has a fixed-point as opposed to another
    kind of attractor, it is important to emphasize that the former does not imply that a world state
    would necessarily persist without interruption. Even though a fixed-point attractor constitutes a
    self-enforcing equilibrium, equilibria are always vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Since a world
    state would remain an at least partially open system, as a matter of historical contingency despite
    its strong homeostatic logic it could temporarily fall apart. Instead, the attractor question here is
    whether there is something in the dynamics of the system itself that would necessarily induce an
    eventual collapse, sending it along another developmental path. Addressing this question gives us
    an opportunity to consider three objections to my argument, each of which highlights a potential
    endogenous source of instability in a world state.71
    The first is Kant’s worry about despotism. Could a world state be despotic? If a world
    state met only the “thin” Weberian criterion of a legitimate monopoly of force, then in principle
    it could be despotic. But in that case by my argument it would not be a stable end-state, since it
    would not satisfy the “thicker” Hegelian criterion of mutual recognition of equality. In such a
    state the struggle for recognition would go on. Since my argument is that we will get a Weberian
    world state by creating a Hegelian one, the real question is whether the latter could be despotic,
    which seems unlikely. The most obvious threat here is a “democratic deficit” (e.g. Wolf, 1999).
    The sheer scale of a world state and the corresponding dilution of voice for its members would
    create a huge distance between them and the state (Dahl, 1994). Although today’s worries about
    the democratic deficit stem primarily from the absence of virtually any formal means by which
    transnational power structures can be held accountable, they are already a source of resistance to
    political integration and might intensify as the latter deepens.
    On the other hand, large democracies today already face this problem, and are not for that
    reason considered inherently unstable. Modern communications technology and institutional
    compromises like representative democracy and subsidiarity can mitigate democratic worries to a
    substantial degree. But the real lesson of modern states is that democracy is not the only basis of
    political legitimacy. The enforcement of mutual recognition of equality, economic well-being, and
    efficiency may be equally important, and could be even more so in a world state. Moreover,
    consider the alternative to a world state, an anarchic world in which territorial states retain their
    sovereignty over violence. It is of the essence of sovereignty that state power can be exercised
    against non-members without unaccountability. Is not that “despotism”? Whether justified or
    not, to whom is the United States accountable for its recent killing of thousands of civilians in
    Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq? Whatever the accountability problems of a world state might be,
    they seem like a more satisfactory solution to the recognition problem than anarchy.
    A second potential threat is nationalism, which in the last century has substantially
    increased the number of states in the system through decolonization, thus at least temporarily
    reversing the historical pattern of global political consolidation to which Carneiro (1978) points.
    However, the rise of nationalism can actually be seen as evidence for my argument, because it is
    about the struggle for recognition. In 1945 a majority of the world’s population lived in empires
    (“despotisms”) that to varying degrees did not recognize them as full subjects. As a result they
    struggled for recognition, and eventually secured their freedom. In that sense nationalism and
    decolonization have made it possible for previously unrecognized actors to participate freely in
    the system, and even contemplate binding themselves to a supranational authority. Any such
    constraints they accept will be consensual and correspondingly stable. Nationalist struggles for
    recognition are by no means over, and more new states – “more anarchy” – may yet be created.
    But while further fragmentation is in one sense a step back, it is also a precondition for moving
    forward, since it is only when difference is recognized that a larger identity can be stable. “The
    greater the diversity between individuals or particulars, the higher the identity or universal in
    which the differences meet.”72 Far from suppressing nationalism, a world state will only be
    possible if it embraces it.
    A last potential source of instability in a world state involves what might seem like a
    contradiction at the heart of my analysis. On the one hand, like today’s states I am arguing that a
    world state would have subjectivity – it would be a corporate person or Self. On the other hand,
    my explanation for the inevitability of a world state assumes that a stable Self depends on mutual
    recognition of equality with an Other. By assimilating all subjects into one collective identity, a
    world state would seem to lack such an Other and thus be unstable. Bracketing the possibility of
    an extra-terrestrial Other (cf. Harrison, 1997), how is this global Self to sustain its subjectivity?
    Who, in short, recognizes the world state?
    Recognition presupposes an axis of differentiation between potential subjects. This
    suggests a two-part answer to the question. First, the world state would be recognized by the
    individuals and groups that constitute its parts, and it in turn would constitute and recognize
    them. This is possible because even though parts and whole here are mutually constitutive, they
    are not identical; there is a boundary or difference between them. The members of a world state
    have their own subjectivities that constrain its behavior, and the world state has a subjectivity
    that constrains their behavior. This internal differentiation allows each to recognize the Other,
    while incorporating that Other within its own definition of Self. Such a process goes on every
    day within today’s territorial states. On the other hand, this comparison also highlights an
    important difference between the two cases, which is that in territorial states the struggle for
    recognition assumes a spatial boundary between members and non-members. Insiders form their
    sense of Self not only in relation to each other, but through practices that differentiate them from
    outside Others. Since a world state would be global, it would not have such an external Other
    available to it, which might be thought to undermine the stability of its subjectivity.
    That leads to the second part of the answer: a world state could compensate for the
    absence of spatial differentiation by creating a temporal differentiation between its present and
    its past (cf. Ruggie, 1993; Waever, 1995). The past here is anarchy, with all its unpleasantness.
    In Hegelian terms we could say that “history” becomes the Other in terms of which the global
    Self is defined. Of course, this Other does not have a subjectivity of its own, and so cannot
    literally recognize the world state. But a functional equivalent to recognition can be achieved by
    an act of temporal self-differentiation. Whether at the individual or collective level, identities are
    always constituted by narratives (Ringmar, 1996), in which a present identity is legitimated in
    relation to a past (and often a future as well). Sometimes, as in many nationalist narratives, this
    process interprets the present Self as identical to an imagined past Self. Other times, however,
    collective narratives draw a distinction between past and present identities. Germany today, for
    example, constitutes its identity in part by its difference from the Nazi state. Temporal selfdifferentiation
    makes mutual constitution possible, thereby enabling “an Other” to stabilize the
    global Self.
    That stability raises a final question: what happens after the world state is reached? Do
    “politics” and “history” come to an end? If by ‘politics’ and ‘history’ we mean what they do in
    anarchy, namely struggles for recognition mediated by war, then yes, in one sense they would be
    over. I say “in one sense” because a world state would still need to reproduce itself and thus be
    forever in process. And since even a world state would not be a perfectly closed system it would
    always be vulnerable to temporary disruptions, like secessionism. However, a world state would
    differ from anarchy in that it would constitute such disruptions as crime, not as politics or
    history. The possibility of crime may always be with us, but for reasons given above it does not
    constitute a stable alternative to a world state. Moreover, politics or history in a different, “non57
    anarchic” sense would clearly not be over. A world state would not be a utopia in which there
    was nothing left to struggle over. Think of what goes on inside states today. They are full of
    problems – crime, poverty, pollution – all of which are the stuff of politics. Indeed, even the
    struggle for recognition, in the thick sense, would continue. There are always new ways to
    constitute thick recognition, and in that sense the struggle for it is part of the human condition
    (Honneth, 1996: 126-7; Bauman, 2001). But once a world state has emerged those struggles will
    be domesticated by enforceable law, and so for purposes of state formation no longer important.
    Rather than a complete end of history, therefore, it might be better to say that a world state
    would be the end of just one kind of history. Even if one telos is over, another would be

  13. Zerayakob Yared
    | #13


    .ዛሬ ትላንትናን እንዳረገዘ ይጓዛል ……………….!!

  14. Ethnic- ideology and impelemen?
    | #14

    ግሩም ለአስተያየትህና ወርልድ-ስቴት ትዎር አመሰግኜህ ወደ ጥያቄ ባልፍስ
    ይህ ወርልድ-ስቴት አይቀሬ ነው ብለህ ታምናለህ?
    ክሆነስ ኤትኒክ-መሰረት ያረገ ፖለቲክሥሥ እንዴት ይቀራል?
    በማወቅና ባለማወቅ ወደ ወርልድ-ስቴት መጋዛችን አይቀሬ ክሆነ መፈራገጥ ነው ብለህ ታምናለህ?
    እንዳባባልህ ሁሉችንም በሁኔታዋች psychologically conditioned ነንና ታዲያስ በወዲህ ሆነ በወዲያ ትልቁ አሳ ነባሪ መዋጡ ካልቀረ ምርጫው የት ነው?

  15. aha!
    | #15

    As I may have already stated the political struggle is among those with ideologies with ethnic federalism and ethnic nationalism versus those with Ethiopian nationalism for unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty of Ethiopia and Ethiopians. This paradigm, which a struggle between positive forces of integration and the negative forces of disintegration, consisting of TPLF/eprdf and its mirror image party in terms of ethnic agenda, rather than agenda, which sets the two factions far apart. If one considers those with national agenda as a cry for “imiye Ethiopia”, so be it, because that speaks for Ethiopia as a whole, the cry for “Imiye Oromia” is for the the part of whole with fuzzy boundaries, that may lead to future conflicts, as well deny the inter mixing of ethnic population by marriage, by immigration and wars forcing the feudal kings to pay taxes,and influx ethnic groups into the capital and cities as an integration process together with resorting to the original provinces with assorted ethnic groups. The constitution based on ethnic and secessionist politics with the ideologies of ethnic federalism and secessionism makes Ethiopian politics unique from the of USA, where the struggle is to a compromise between ultra radical right wing conservatism, social conservatism, and moderate conservatism and liberal and/or social democracy, while of Egypt is that secularism and Islamism both of which perhaps leaning towards social democracy. On the other hand, the struggle in Ethiopia as I may have already indicated is among ethnic federalism and Ethnic nationalism versus Ethiopian nationalism, that embraces giving precedence to individual freedom, liberty and equality, ahead of ethnic and secessionist rights, the sovereignty of Ethiopia, its territorial integrity and its flag.

    With respect to the concept of globalization, where the world is looked as one global village manipulated by multi-national corporations is common agenda for all nations and has nothing to do with ethnic and secessionist politics and/or policies in Ethiopia, supper imposed by totalitarianism and/or state capitalism with free market capitalism enjoyed TPLF/EFFORT, etc.

    As far as the Thesis presented in the website in connection with concept of globalization, it is only a literature review but does not meet the approach constructing a model as a global problem solving formula, to say the least about ethnic rights versus individual rights.

  16. Alemu Mulugeta
    | #16

    Thank you Prof Mesay for your constant reflection of the prevailing political situation in our country. You have been diligently and responsibly ringing the alarm bells for the last twenty odd years showing the dangers of ethnic politics.
    I wish many more intellectuals were engaged and shared us their views and visions the way you do.
    I believe that we are heading to a disaster travelling on the hard and inflexible ethnic rail.
    The coming years, I fear,are not going to be halcyon days even for those who think they have it made their ways.
    TPLF and the Tigrayan elites,the main architects and beneficiaries of this ethnic political edifice are blinded by their current ‘windfall’ and do not see the bad future ahead not just for others but for themselves,too.

    The ‘hated’ Amharas,the name of a decentralized people whom TPLF and their surrogate ethnic politicians have taught their co-ethnics to hate as a source of ethnic oppression, are not the only ones loosing.
    No doubt, Amharas will lose big time. The perilous ways have been paved for that.
    Through the virulent fascistic propaganda and endemic ethnic politics of the regime,the Amharas have been marked out as number one enemy by the elites of all ethnic groups who cohabit with TPLF.
    The hatred towards Amharas is so deep and widespread.In some places in the country,including Tigray, the pernicious credo has seeped through the psychology of many people and those people are brainwashed to believe that the cause of their poverty,inequality and the frustrations of the political ambition of the political elite and other ills have all been ascribed to the ‘evil’ Amharas. As a result,the Amharas are cast as perfect scapegoats like the victims of the Rwandan holocaust thanks to the TPLF machinations. who,they vindictively think that,if they can not any longer rule Ethiopia, that should be the fate that should await their ‘historical’ enemies. That is their notorious ‘hundred years homework’ for the Amharas. Post TPLF, nothing but a long lasting conflagration is the thing that they want to leave us as a legacy. But, would they be okay in their painstakingly built and enriched homeland,the Tigray republic,if and when that happens? How long would that building and enrichment last without its Ethiopian source? How long the prestige? The ‘African statesmanship and value-added recognition ‘ of the late Meles,for example, was obtained not because he was a Tigrayan but because he was an Ethiopian. So how does that work for the ‘no influential’ future mini-republic of Tigray? Will Tigray try to grow bigger and become greater by trying to amalgamate with Eritrea? Have Tigrayan elites thought about these and other issues long and hard beyond the fanfare and the KHBERO?
    How could they think they would be safe and sound while their neighbours were in strife and turmoil?
    We are all in these for good for ill!

  17. etie
    | #17

    I appreciate Dr Messay he is writing about one of the important or number one probleme of ethiopia.

    When you study the divisions of countries like chekoslovakia,yougoslavia, in one side and you see what is happening now in belgium ,you find that these countries are not homogenous.Ethiopia is not also homogenous populations.So in the futur ethiopia will be transformed into nations and nationalities countries.The question is how one can suuceed to make peacefull transformation.

  18. Ethnic- ideology and impelemen?
    | #18

    Our efforts and contributions to determine the future of our country is not that significant when I compare it with what is being thrown and continue to be thrown at us. For example, Woyane is thrown at us or imposed on us. Tomorrow also an other political party would be thrown at us through the back door.

    I mean all of us- whether we are promoting ethnic based politics or unity we do not determine our future.

    My basis for my conclusion is based on by seeing what is happening to Greece, UK, Egypt. I am not saying our political culture is similar to these countries but because their politicians and political parties have support and followers. In other words, we do not have that much support from our people.

    a. If I take UK: Scotland is going to have a referendum in 2014 to separate from UK.
    b. if we take Greece – the citizens do not have any saying on what is being imposed on them from Brussels. future is bleak. what is worse their politicians are divided.

    C. If we take Egypt- ideological differences and animosity between Brotherhood & Military does not seem to settle for many coming years.

    How could we think then we make a difference considering our lack of working withing the people?

  19. Satenaw
    | #19

    Asmesay, I have nothing more to say. Your name says it all (Semin melak yawetawal)

  20. ግሩም
    | #20

    ላቀረብካቸው ጥያቄዎች ቀጥታ መልስ ለመስጠት ባልችልም የተወሰነ ልሞክር፡፡

    የፖለቲካ ምህዳሩን የተቆጣጠሩት ብዙዎቹ ኢትዮጵያውያን ምሁራንና ፖለቲከኞች ልሂቃን ታሪካዊና ተጨባጩን የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝምን ኒዎ-ሊበራል ኒዎ-ኮሎኒያሊዝም ኢምፔሪያሊስታዊ ፕሮጀከት በቅጡ በጥልቀትና በስፋት አልተረዱትም ብል ድፍረት አይሆንብኝም፡፡በዚህ የተነሳም ሁሉም እየተነሳ አባባ እማማ እንደሚባለው አንደ ህፃን ልጅ የአፍ መፍቻ ቋንቋ ዲሞክራሲ ሰብዓዊ መብት ነፃ-ገበያ ከማለት ውጪ ይህ የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም አለም አቀፍ ስርዓት በነፃ-ገበያ ስርዓትና በዲሞክራሲ ተረት-ተረት ቲዎሪ ብቻ እንደማይመራ ላለፉት 20 ዓመታት ያህል በቅጡ ያየነው ነገር ነው፡፡ብዙ እርቀት ሳንሄድ ይህንን እውነታ ለመረዳት ድግሞ የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም ዋና ማእከል የበላይ ጠባቂና አራማጅ የሆነችው ልእለ-ሃያል አሜሪካ በዓለም ላይ ከ700 በላይ የሚሊታሪ ቤዞች ያላትና የተቀሩት ሃያላን መንግስታት ዓመታዊ የሚሊታሪ በጀት ቢደመር የማይስተካከል በጀት የምትመድበው ለምንድን ነው?አሸባሪነትን ለመከላከል?ሰብዓዊ መብትን ለማክበር?ዲሞክራሲንና ነፃ-ገበያ ለማስፋፋት? ዋናው ምክንያቱ ግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም በተፈጥሮው ግለኛ ተስፋፊና ጦረኛ ስለሆነ ነው፡፡በዘመነ ግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም ብዙዎች ስለ ሙስናና ስለ ሰብዓዊ መብት ጥሰት ሲያወሩ በጣም ይገርመኛል፡፡Human-right violation and corruption are the main inherent attributes of the system.የአንደኛው የዓለም ጦርነት ሁለተኛው የዓለም ጦርነትና ከዚያም በመቀጠል የነበረው የመጀመሪያው የቀዝቃዛው ጦርነትና አሁንም እያንዣበበ ያለው አለም አቀፍ ውጥረት ግጭትና ጦርነት ሁሉ ከራሱ ከግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም ውስጣዊ የተፈጥሮ አሰራር ጋር በጣሙን የተያያዘና ከዚህም ስርዓት የመነጩ ናቸው፡፡ብዙዎች ኢትዮጵያውያን ምሁራንና ፖለቲከኞች የቀዝቃዛው ጦርነትን ምንነት በቅጡ ስላልተረዱ የቀዝቃዛው ጦርነትን ማክተም ልክ ቀጣይ የዲሞክራሲ ዘመን እየመጣ እንደሆነ አድርገን በጥራዝ-ነጠቅነት ነበር የተረዳነው፡፡እውነታው ግን ግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም በዘመነ ቀዝቃዛው ጦርነት ከሶሻሊስቱ ጎራ የነበረበትን የተወሰነ ፈተናና እግታ(Check and balance or Constraints) በጊዚያዊነት አሸንፎ አሁን የጦር ግዳዩን የሚሰበስብበት(Consolidation of Capital) ዘመን መሆኑ ነው፡፡ለምሳሌ በአሜሪካና በአውሮፓ በ2008 ተፈጠረ የተባለውን የፋይናንስ ቀውስ ተከትሎ ተግባራዊ የሆነው የ Bank Bailout እና Austerity Measure እና ይህንንም ተከትከሎ የተፈጠረው የኢኮኖሚ ቀውስና የማህበራዊ ቀውስ (በእርግጥ በቀጣይ ፖለቲካዊ ቀውስ አይቀሬ ነው) ይህንን የሚያሳይ ነው፡፡ዲሞክራሲ ነፃ-ገበያ ሰብዓዊ-መብት ገለመሌ የሚባለው ነገር ያን ያህል ብዙም እውነታ የሌለውና የራሱ የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም ቅጥረኛ ፖለቲከኞችና ምሁራን እራሳቸው ያላመኑበትን ነገር ግን ለእንጀራቸው ሲሉ ብቻ የታችኛውን ህዝብ የሚያጃጅሉበት ፈሊጥ ነው፡፡እንኳንስ የታችኛው የህብረተሰብ ክፍል የራሱን እድል በራሱ ሊወስን ቀርቶ በሰለጠነውም ሆነ በታዳጊው ዓለም ውስጥ ስልጣን ላይ የሚወጡት ቅጥረኛ ምሁራንና ፖለቲከኞችም ጭምር ተግባራዊ የሚያደርጉት ፖለሲና እስትራቴጂ ለህዝብ ቃል የገቡትን ሳይሆን በጓሮ በር ከላይ የሚሰጣቸውን የራሱን የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝምን ኒዎ-ሊበራል ኒዎ-ኮሎኒያሊዝም ኢምፔሪያሊስታዊ ፕሮጀከት ነው፡፡የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም ዓለም አቀፍ ሰርዓት ምንም ሳይነካ እስከቀጠለ ድረስ የምርጫ ዲሞክራሲ ለቅጥረኛ ፖለቲከኞች የስራ እድል ከመፍጠር በዘለለ ለታችኛው ህዝብ ብዙም የሚፈይው ነገር የሌለው ለዚህ ነው፡፡በዚህ የተነሳም በአሁኑ ወቅት በእንደኛ አይነት ታዳጊው አለም ውስጥም ብቻም ሳይሆን በሰለጠነው አለም በአውሮፓና አሜሪካም ጭምር ህዝቡ በተለመዱት Mainstream ፖለቲከኞችና በስርዓቱ ላይ ያለው አመኔታ ቀስ በቀስ እየመነመነ ነው የመጣው፡፡በተለይም ኦባማ Change ብሎ ስልጣን ላይ ከወጣ ወዲህ የባሰ እንጂ የተሻለ ነገር ስላልመጣ በራሱ በግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም አለም አቀፍ ስርዓት ላይ ከፍተኛ አመኔታ ማጣት እየተፈጠረ ነው፡፡ወደ እኛ ሀገር ስንመጣም ወያኔና ሻእብያ የራሱ የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም ኒዎ-ሊበራል ኒዎ-ኮሎኒያሊዝም ኢምፔሪያሊስታዊ ፕሮጀከት ቅጥረኞች ናቸው፡፡ህዝቡን በዘር በሃይማኖት በፆታ ከተማ/ገጠር ሲቪል/ወታደር ወዘተ እየከፋፈሉ እርስ በርስ የሚያናክሱት የሚያዳክሙት በራሳቸው የፈጠሩት ነገር ሆኖ ሳይሆን የምእራብ ሀገር መንግስታት አለቆቻቸው የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝምን ኒዎ-ሊበራል ኒዎ-ኮሎኒያሊዝም ኢምፔሪያሊስታዊ ፕሮጀከት በከፋፍለህ ግዛው ስልት እንዲያስፈፅሙ ከትጥቅ ትግሉ ጀምሮ በተለያየ መንገድ እየረዱ ስልጣን ላይ ስላወጧቸው ነው፡፡ስለዚህም ከላይ ያሉት የግሎባል ካፒታሊስቱ ሀብታም ልሂቃን እንደ ወያኔ አይነት ቅጥረኛ ሃይሎችንና ሌሎችንም በብሄር በዘር ወዘተ እያደራጁ የሚደግፉትና ስልጣን ላይ የሚያወጡት ይህ ስራ ጥሩ እንዳልሆነ ሳይረዱት ቀርተው ሳይሆን የግድ የራሳቸው የጥቂቶች ስርዓት እንዲቀጥል የግድ ብዙሃኑ ህዝብ በዚህ አይነት አርተፊሻል ልዩነት እርስ በርሱ እየተናከሰ መዳከም ስላለበት ብቻ ነው፡፡የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝምን ኒዎ-ሊበራል ኒዎ-ኮሎኒያሊዝም ኢምፔሪያሊስታዊ ፕሮጀከት ህብረ-በሄራዊና ናሽናሊስት የሆነ ጠንካራና ታላቅ ሀገር(Sovereign and Independent Nation-State) እንዲፈጠር አይፈልግም፡፡በዚህ የተነሳም የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝምን ኒዎ-ሊበራል ኒዎ-ኮሎኒያሊዝም ኢምፔሪያሊስታዊ ፕሮጀከት የሚቃወሙ ታላላቅ ሀገራት አሸባሪነት የሰብዓዊ-መብት ወዘተ አይነት ተቀፅላ ታፔላ እየተለጠፈላቸው Rogue-State እየተባሉ የተለያየ ትንኮሳና ሴራ ይሰራባቸዋል ሲከፋም ቀጥታ ወረራ ይፈፀምባቸዋል፡፡ስለዚህም ታላላቅ ሀገራት ውስጣዊ የሆነ ተጨባጭና ታሪካዊ(በተለይም ከጥንቱ ቅኝ-ግዛት ጋር በማያያዝ) የሆነ የብሄር የሃይማኖት ወዘተ ክፍፍልና ግጭትን መሰረት ያደረገ ልዩነትና አለመግባባት እያራገቡና እያጋጋሉ የእርስ በርስ መናከስ ግጭትና ጦርነት ውስጥ በመክተት በስተመጨረሻ እነዚህ ታላላቅ ሀገራት እንዲዳከሙና እንዲበታተኑ(Balkanization) ይደረጋል፡፡የኤርትራ መገንጠልና የኢትዮጵያ የባህር በር በሻጥር መከልከል የዚህ የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም ኒዎ-ሊበራል ኒዎ-ኮሎኒያሊዝም ኢምፔሪያሊስታዊ ፕሮጀከት ውጤት ነው፡፡በሱዳን በኢራቅ በዩጎዝላቭያ በሶማሊያ በሊቢያ በሶርያ ወዘተ የነበረውና ያለው ነገር ይህንን የሚያሳይ ነው፡፡ትልቁ ባቡር ውስጥ የተሳፈሩት ሰዎች አማራ ኦሮሞ ትግሬ ወዘተ ብለው ቡድን ለይተው ቢቀመጡም ሆነ ባቡሩ ውስጥ ወደፈለጉት አቅጣጫ ቢራወጡ ቢዘሉ የባቡሩን አቅጣጫና ጉዞ ያን ያህል ሊገቱት አይችሉም፡፡አማራ ኦሮሞ ትግሬ ብለው እርስ በርስ የሚጋጩት ሞኞች በሌላ በኩል የአውሮፓን ሊግ አርሰናል ማንቸስተር ብለው በአንድነት ሲመለከቱና አንዳንዴም ደግሞ ሲጣሉ ታያለህ፡፡ነገር ግን ለአርሰናል የተጫወተው ፕሮፌሽናል ተጨዋች መልሶ ለማንቸስተር እየተጫወተ በድሮው ቡድን ላይ ጎል ሲያስቆጥር ምንም ቅር አይለውም፡፡Because money rules the world.
    We have collectivist identity which I admit but it is such an artificial and tactical contrived construct by the crafty ruling elites to hype it beyond what is deserved in order to achieve their strategic objective through the scheme of divide and conquer/rule. Paradoxically on the other side we have to admit that we are evolving to become a homogeneous global society through material consumerism and the technology. So universality and identity are just two sides of the same coin of our humanity.
    ሌላው ግሎባላይዜሽን የሚለውን ነገር ሰሙንና ወርቁን በቅጡ መለየት ይገባል፡፡ ማለትም “Globalization of what?” የሚለውን ጥያቄ ማንሳት ይገባል፡፡ይህንን ጥያቄ ካላነሳን ግሎባላይዜሽን የሚባለውን ነገር ጫፍና ጫፍ በረገጠ በነጭና በጥቁር አየሳልነው ወይ በመጥፎ ወይንም በጥሩ በተሳሳተ ሁኔታ ልንፈርጀው እንችላለን፡፡ለምሳሌ የምንኖርባት መሬት አንድ ስለሆነችና ሁላችንም የአዳምና የሄዋን የሰው ዘር ስለሆንን ከሚለያዩን ነገሮች ይልቅ አንድ የሚያደርጉን ነገሮች ስለሚበዙ አጠቃለዩ የሰው ዘር የጋራ እጣ ፈንታውን በጋራ የመምከርና የመወሰን የተፈጥሮና የታሪክ ግዴታ አለበት፡፡ይህም ብቻም አይደለም መሬት ያላት ውስን የተፈጥሮ ሀብት ስለሆነ ይህንን ውስን የተፈጥሮ ሀብት በቅጡ ካልያዝነውና አሁን ባለው የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም አካሄድ በዋናነት ለጥቂቶች የገንዘብ ትርፍ(Money-Capital-Accumulation Through Money-Capital-Sequencing) ብቻ እየተባለ ያለአግባብ የምናባክነው ከሆነ ወደፊት ይህ የእኔ ግዛት ነው ያ የአንተ ግዛት ነው የሚባል ተፈጥሯዊ ወሰን ስለሌለ እራስን ማዳንና ማኖር (Survival) የተፈጥሮ ግፊት ስለሆነ ይህ ሀገር ወይንም ድንበር የሚባለው ነገር ሊገድበው የማይቻልበት ደረጃ ሊመጣ ይችላል፡፡እንደዚሁም አንዱ ሀገር ያለው ዋና ሀብት የእውቀትና የሰው ሃይል ከሆነ ያንን የእውቀትና የሰው ሃይል የተፈጥሮ ሀብት ላለው ሸጦ በምትኩ የሚያስፈልገውን የጥሬ ሀብት ማግኘት የተፈጥሮና የማህበራዊ ህግ ነው፡፡ስለዚህም በጋራ ህልውና ደህንነት ፍላጎትና ጥቅም ላይ የተመሰረተ ጤናማ የሆነ አለም አቀፍ የንግድ ስርዓት አስፈላጊ ነው ማለት ነው፡፡
    ነገር ግን John Perkins የፃፈውን “Confessions of The Economic Hit Men” ስናነብና ስናስታውስ ግን ግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም በተፈጥሮው ግለኛ ጦረኛና ተስፋፊ በመሆኑ የተነሳ በነፃ-ገበያ እና በዲሞክራሲ ተረት-ተረት ብቻ እንደማይመራ በጥሞና እንረዳለን፡፡ስለዚህም World-Bank, IMF,WTO የተባሉት አለም አቀፍ የፋይናንስ ተቋማትና የንግድ ድርጅቶች ብቻቸውን አይደለም እየሰሩ ያሉት ከጎናቸው ወይንም ከበስተጀርባ ደግሞ NATO የሚባለው የሚሊታሪ የቀኝ እጅ ሃይል አብሮ አለ፡፡አለም በዲሞክራሲና ነፃ-ገበያ ቲዎሪ ብቻ የመትመራ ቢሆን ኖሮ ለምን NATO አስፈለገ፡፡አቶ መለስም ነፍሳቸውን ይማረውና አንድ ወቅት ላይ አለም በዲሞክራሲና በህግ ብቻ ነው የምትመራው ብሎ የሚያስብ ካለ እርሱ ሞኝ ነው ያሉትን ማስታወስ ይገባል፡፡ምክንያቱም አቶ መለስና ወያኔ የራሱ የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝምን ኒዎ-ሊበራል ኒዎ-ኮሎኒያሊዝም ኢምፔሪያሊስታዊ ፕሮጀከት የሚያስፈፅሙ ቅጥረኛ ስለነበሩ የምእራቡን አለም ሁኔታ እንደ ውስጥ አዋቂነታቸው ዲሞክራሲ-ዲሞክራሲ እያለ እንደበቀቀን እንደወረደ ከሚያለዝነውና የምእራቡን አለም እንደ ቅዱስ መልአክ ከሚያመልከው ከአብዛኛው ከተቃዋሚው ጎራ በተሻለ እንደሚረዱት ለመገመት አይከብድም፡፡መለስም ዲሞክራሲ-ዲሞክራሲ እያለ እንደበቀቀን እንደወረደ የሚያለዝነውን የተቃዋሚውን ጎራም የውሸት የምርጫ ዲሞክራሲ እያዘጋጁ ዲሞክራሲ እንቁልልጭ እያሉ እንደ ጅል ሲያጃጅሉትና ሲንቁት የኖሩትም ለዚህ ይመስለኛል፡፡ሌላው NATO እነ ሊቢያን ወሮ ጋዳፊን በአሳዛኝ ሁኔታ ገድሎ ከስልጣን ያስወገደው እውን ጋዳፊ አምባገነንና አረመኔ ስለሆነ ብቻ ከሆነ ከጋዳፊ በባሰ ህዝባቸውን እየረገጡና እየዘረፉ እያስተዳደሩ ያሉት ወያኔም ሆነ የመካከለኛው ምስራቅ የሞናርኪ አገዛዞች እንዴት የአሜሪካና የምእራቡ አለም ጥበቃና ከለላ የሚደረግላቸው ወዳጅ ሆነው እስካሁን ሊዘልቁ ቻሉ?ግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም የሚመራበት መርህ ምን እንደሆነ ገና በቅጡ አልገባንም ማለት ነው፡፡ግሎባላይዜሽን ስንል እንግዲህ ይህንን ሁሉ ቅኔ መረዳት አለብን፡፡ሌላው የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም ዋና መመሪያ የሆነው (Money-Capital as in put ) -> (Nature-Capital/Life-Capital/Social-Capital/Human-Capital …. as intermediate means) ->More of Money-Capital as an end-game out put የሚባለው አሁን ያለው የጥቂቶችን ህልውና ደህንነት ፍላጎትና ጥቅም የሚያገለግልና ብዙሃኑን የሚያገል የግሎባል ካፒታሊዝም የቢዝነስ ሂደት ወይንም ኡደት መቆምና በምትኩ Nature-Capital/Life-Capital/Social-Capital/Human-Capital-> Money-Capital as an intermediate exchange means or media->More of Nature-Capital/Life-Capital/Social-Capital/Human-Capital ……)በሚባለው የብዙሃኑን ህልውና ደህንነት ፍላጎትና ጥቅም የሚያገለግል የተሻለ ሌላ የአለም ስርዓት የሆነ የቢዝነስ ሂደት ወይንም ኡደት መተካት አለበት፡፡ይህ ደግሞ ዘር ሃይማኖት ፆታ እውቀት ወዘተ የማይለያየው የሰው ዘር ሁሉ አጀንዳ ነው፡፡ስለዚህም በላችን ላይ ተጭኖብን እያራመድን ያለነውን የዓለም አቀፍ ስርዓቱን ተፈጥሯዊ ባህሪ በቅጡ ሳንረዳ በዘር በሃይማኖት በፆታ ወዘተ እርስ በርስ መናከስና መዳከሙ ወይንም በውሸት የፓርቲ ፖለቲካ የውሸት ዲሞክራሲን ነፃ-ገበያን ሰብዓዊ መብትን ማቀንቀኑ ምንም የሚፈይደው ነገር የለም፡፡This all bogus ethnic politics or party politics or Democracy or Free-market or Human-rights ….. hyped mantra in a small room is contained under the big paradigm setup building of Global Capitalism. Under this paradigm setup what we call democracy is just a mere entertainment illusion and fantasy provided for the naive and gullible mass by the crafty elites through their pawn politicians and intellectuals. Look TPLF has allowed us to have around 80 political parties but what are we doing with it for the last 22 years Or TPLF has allowed nationalities to show up and dance on the stages in evidence of the hyped ethnic freedom but on the other hand it is dislocating native farmers from their land and selling it off to foreigners. Even we have to admit that this is the main attributes of the prevailing global system in that it provides us artificial non-life or anti-life in puts but on the other hand it deprives us of genuine basic pro-life inputs. Based on the principle of “Hierarchy of Needs” an Ethiopian first and for most needs economic security of survival nature like a bread to eat or a shelter to live more than a mere hype of his ethnic identity or bogus electoral democracy. That is how the mass evaluates the politicians.
    However It is the usual modus operandi that the pawn politicians just divert the legitimate demand of the mass that are of primary economic security of survival nature to mere antagonizing secondary ethnic politics or religious issues because they can not answer such legitimate demands which is because the capitalist system itself can not answer such economic demands. What has happened in Egypt is like this. The main problem of the Egyptian peoples is primary economic security of survival nature. Neo-Liberal global capitalism has caused such a massive abject impoverishment on the Egyptian people under the 30 years reign of dictator Hosini Mubark who serves as a stooge client-regime of the West. However, what we usually observe is things wrongly attributed to religious fundamentalism related to Muslim Brotherhood or whatever. That is the secondary problem but the main problem is Economic problem. Muslim Brother-Hood, also same insidious stooge of the West but in a different orientation, like the secular Hosini Mubark, does not address the real problems of the Egyptian people because it is such a mere religious fundamentalist that does not address the ills of global capitalism and its neo-liberal and neo-colonialism imperialistic projects. So the mass has always been entrapped to chose between evils. As far as I understand the naïve and gullible mass has always been cheated to divert his attention to artificially constructed contrived differences and enemies rather than common real enemies and agendas. It does not as such solve the real problems of Muslim Egyptians if they are wrongly agitated and tempted by Muslim Brotherhood or religious fundamentalist to kill and attack Christian Egyptians and the converse is also true. The same is true in Ethiopia based on ethnic and religious fundamentalism.
    So the solution for the ills of Global Capitalism is Global Solution be it Global Socialism or whatever. It does not matter which terminology or means we may apply but the main point is on the end-game of achieving the general wellbeing of the entire human race and its very survival. So I am not a blind supporter or detractor of the mere euphemism of Globalization but the main point is “Globalization of What?”. As long as there is global humanity then there is global interconnection and hence global problems and global solution are inevitable. For your other question regarding World Governance there has been significant implementation of the beginnings of world governance especially after the end of Cold-war under the patronage of super power Global-Empire USA. Can it be successful or is it inevitable and what is the real motive behind and the end-game agenda? Very difficult question as to the capacity of my knowledge. However we can not deny that it is already under construction. But if you carefully read the referenced article it implies it is already under construction and also inevitable. However some give it religious insight and justification by attaching World Governance to 666.Any way the main aim of my commentary is to let us stop on the usual hyping of mere electoral democracy and party politics or ethnic politics or individual identity/right or that of the notion of Nations-State and view things from a different perspective and also to view the big picture. We have to also observe that there is already a massive global human consciousness and awakening underway beyond the mere paradigm setup of bogus electoral democracy and free-market mantra or ethnic politics as in Ethiopia. I think the majority of Ethiopian politician and intellectual elites who monopoly control the political scene are a bit asleep and needs to wakeup from their slumber. In those Western nations time is almost to become over to cheat the desperate mass under the mantra of the usual party politics and its associated Electoral democracy and the mass is losing hope and trust on the system itself but here our politicians are still/yet to engage in this same old fashion thing. As long as we are in the same paradigm setup of the system it does not matter which party or politician comes and goes. Because it is the system stupid!!!
    Even ethnicity in Ethiopia is the result of global capitalism and its neo-liberal and neo-colonialism imperialistic projects due to its inherent schema of forming hierarchical class structures according to the law of the pyramid. Few Ethnic elites, not the ethnic group, are the main beneficiaries of ethnic politics serving as a stooge comprador elite in order to contain that set of ethnicity. And accordingly and consequentially some ethnic group will become relatively more beneficiary than others. Any way secular and nationalist sovereign independent Nation-State, even real democracy for that matter, is not as such the desired one by global capitalism and its neo-liberal and neo-colonialism imperialistic projects because it benefits the majority mass politically as well as economically. The other thing we have to admit is that if there is no real economic freedom then there is no real political freedom and the converse is true.


    God Bless Ethiopia!!!

  21. Alliance
    | #21

    —–Should We Still Suggest an All-Inclusive Alliance, Which Can Be Different and Make a Difference in Ethiopia/Oromia?—–

    In the liberation struggle against the oppressive Abyssinian empire’s system, we had passed through different phases, and we had formed till now different alliances against the tyrant rulers. The struggle has almost always been done by two ideologically opposite political camps, i.e. by the unionist liberators, who want to liberate oppressed nations in the empire and build, where possible, a union of autonomous nations, and by the unitarist patriots, who do disregard the autonomy of nations, but want to liberate individual citizens from any sort of oppression. In other words, it has been the struggle by those emphasizing group (national) liberty and by those stressing individual (citizens’) freedom. Despite their similarity in socialist ideology, one of the major differences between Me’ison and Ihapa was their tendency towards being a unionist and a unitarist, respectively. Me’ison, being dominated and led by Oromo intellectuals, had been for self-determination of nations in a sense of having their own national autonomy within the Ethiopian union, whereas Ihapa, being dominated and led by Tigrean intellectuals, had been for self-determination of nations in a sense of exercising their cultures within a unitary Ethiopia/Great Oromia without national autonomy.

    In a further political process, both Me’ison and Ihapa, after being brutally beaten by the Derg, opted to join their kin in the OLF and the TPLF, respectively. Now, Ihapa, with its unitarist view, had taken power in a form of the TPLF, and the unionist Me’ison, in a form of the OLF, is still the main opposition/rebel group against this Ihapa-dominated regime. Simply put, the struggle between the unionist Me’ison and the unitarist Ihapa is still going on indirectly. After coming to power, the unitarist TPLF was compelled to accept and respect certain elements of the unionist OLF, so that it signed the 1991 Charter, which formally accepted the right of all nations and nationalities in the empire to have their own self-rule (autonomy) within Great Oromia. But in practice, the Woyane has chosen to implement more unitarist elements of its own, neglecting that of the unionists. That is why Great Oromia is today de jure a union, but de facto a unitary state.
    Read more:

Comments are closed.